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Foreword
This issue of the Financial Stability Report (FSR), the 7
th in the series, coincides by happenstance with the 
fi fth anniversary of the collapse of Lehman Brothers that triggered the biggest fi nancial crisis of our times. 
Subsequently, the Euro Area sovereign debt crisis added fuel to the fi re. Concerted action by governments, 
central banks, regulators and multilateral institutions helped to douse the inferno, but the embers still glow.
This FSR is set in an environment of continued uncertainty at the global level and diffi dence on the domestic 
front. The slowdown in growth is the most worrisome factor, as industrial activity is stubbornly subdued and 
services remain below trend. Policy measures initiated to improve the fi scal situation have, however, provided 
some reassurance, and international investors are taking note of this in their assessment of the outlook for India. 
Following the measures taken to ease the supply bottlenecks, the growth outlook for 2013-14 is relatively optimistic 
as evidenced by the forecasts of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the Reserve Bank’s 
own estimates. The asset quality of banks has shown improvement, albeit marginal, since the last FSR (December 
2012), but it is too early to make a defi nitive inference about whether this is a trend.
This FSR highlights inter alia the risk to macroeconomic stability from the rising current account defi cit (CAD). 
Cross border volatile capital fl ows have made India vulnerable to sudden stops and reversals, as evidenced recently, 
following the slightest hint of exit from quantitative easing (QE) by the Federal Reserve. Both the Government 
and the Reserve Bank have taken measures to dampen the import of gold in order to restrain the CAD to a more 
sustainable level. In the short-term, our efforts have been directed at fi nancing the CAD as that will give space and 
time to put in place structural reforms that will address the more deep-seated problems confronting the economy. 
While stress tests reveal that the fi nancial system is resilient to shocks currently, deteriorating macroeconomic 
stability can eventually erode fi nancial stability.
The perception that India is a diffi cult country to do business in persists, and is inhibiting investment, 
especially foreign investment. We need to introspect why we rank so low on indices like the Economic Freedom 
Index (111/144)1 or Global Competitive Index (59/144)2 and why we keep slipping in these rankings.
This FSR also takes stock of the progress in the implementation of the post crisis G20/ Financial Stability 
Board (FSB) reforms in India in areas like Basle III, regulatory framework, OTC derivatives, supervision of 
Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs), oversight of shadow banking, legal entity identifi er (LEI) and 
the like. The nature of the problems and the pace of recovery have differed across jurisdictions, so have their policy 
responses. The impediments to progress in the implementation of reforms in the form of cross border issues and 
extraterritorial implications of certain national laws have also been discussed.
In the years before the crisis, the fi nancial sector took on a life of its own with a growing belief that real 
growth can be generated by sheer fi nancial engineering. That myth is now demolished. We now know that the 
fi nancial sector has no standing of its own; it matters only to the extent that it aids the growth of the real sector. 
It is this wisdom that must guide the ongoing global effort at fi nancial sector reforms; it is this wisdom that must 
inform the Reserve Bank’s policies and actions.
Dr. D. Subbarao
June 27, 2013
1   Fraser Institute Canada. (www.freetheworld.com) 
2  World Economic Forum: The Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013
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Overview
Introduction
The Financial Stability Report (FSR) for India is being 
published biannually in June and December for the last 
three years. The FSR includes the contributions from all 
the fi nancial sector regulators and is currently being 
approved by the Sub–Committee of the Financial 
Stability and Development Council (FSDC).
Structure of FSR
The fi rst chapter of the FSR discusses macro-fi nancial 
risks in the global and domestic economies and markets, 
providing a backdrop in which the fi nancial system has 
been functioning. The second chapter of the report 
focusses on the soundness and resilience of fi nancial 
institutions and discusses, amongst other things, the 
interconnectedness of the fi nancial system. It presents 
the results of various stress tests conducted for 
assessment of resilience of scheduled commercial banks, 
scheduled urban cooperative banks and non-banking 
fi nance companies, to different types of risks. The 
chapter also includes coverage on insurance and pension 
sectors, which are important segments of the fi nancial 
services sector. The last chapter gives an assessment in 
the progress of implementation of post crisis reforms 
proposed by G20/ Financial Stability Board, with specifi c 
reference to Indian position, and also includes other 
regulatory issues of systemic importance. The fi ndings 
of the Systemic Risk Survey are presented at Annex 1. 
Methodology underlying some of the analytics used in 
the report is given at Annex 2.
Macro fi nancial Risks
Global Economy and Markets
The announcement by Federal Reserve of the phased 
withdrawal from the bond buying programme has 
signalled the inevitability of eventual exit from the 
unconventional monetary policies adopted by major 
central banks. The risks which have been building up 
over the last fi ve years of excess liquidity in the global 
system are now surfacing. The markets, especially in 
emerging economies need to be prepared for spells of 
high volatility and uncertainty going ahead. Global 
growth remains tepid and multipaced. Asset bubbles in 
housing might have been building up in certain parts of 
the globe.
Domestic Economy and Markets
The macroeconomic risks to Indian economy have 
increased over the last six months, mainly on the 
dimensions of domestic growth, external sector and 
corporate sector performance. Domestic supply 
bottlenecks, policy uncertainty, consequential dampened 
investment sentiment and slackening external demand 
contributed signifi cantly to the slowdown, though fall 
in inflation and significant fiscal correction have 
provided some relief.
Current account defi cit and its non- disruptive fi nancing 
have emerged as major challenges from the perspective 
of macroeconomic stability. Various measures taken to 
dampen import demand for gold are taking hold and 
policy efforts are currently on to attract more stable long 
term capital through foreign direct investment (FDI) 
route. 
The performance of Indian corporate sector has been 
subdued and in the emerging scenario, their increased 
external borrowing and unhedged foreign exchange 
exposures may further increase their vulnerabilities. On 
the fiscal front, there has been some credible 
improvement, refl ecting in upgrade of outlook on India 
to ‘stable’ by one of the major credit rating agencies.
Financial Institutions: Soundness and Resilience
Scheduled Commercial Banks
Risks to banking sector have increased since the 
publication of the last FSR in December 2012, mainly in 
terms of asset quality and profi tability. The asset quality 
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continues to remain under intense focus and prudential 
measures have been taken to step up the provisions on 
restructured accounts. The FSR also analyses the 
improved performance on parameters of credit and 
deposit growth, asset quality etc during the last quarter 
of the fi nancial year and fi nds signifi cant ‘seasonality’ 
in these parameters. The contraction in export credit 
during recent quarters is attracting the attention of 
policy makers. The growth in credit to micro and small 
enterprises (MSE) sector needs to be sustained.
Interconnectedness in the financial and banking 
systems
The Banking Stability Measures, based on co-movements 
in equity prices of listed banks, have shown some 
improvement in distress dependencies between banks. 
The network of the Indian fi nancial system shows that 
the asset management companies and insurance 
companies have a high degree of exposure to the banking 
system. The liquidity contagion analysis brings out the 
risks from interconnectedness entrenched in the 
structure of the fi nancial system.
Stress Tests
Macro stress tests indicate that if the current 
macroeconomic conditions persist, the credit quality of 
commercial banks could deteriorate further. However, 
the comfortable position on the banks’ capital adequacy 
front lends resilience as shown by the top-down stress 
testing exercises on various risks. The results of the 
bottom-up stress tests (sensitivity analysis) carried out 
by select banks, also testify to the general resilience of 
the banks to different kinds of shocks. This issue of FSR 
introduces the analysis of NPAs on the basis of Estimated 
Losses approach for assessment of provisioning and 
capital adequacy of banks. The results show that, while 
the present level of provisions is adequate, a gap may 
arise under severe stress scenario.
The stress tests on capital and liquidity aspects of the 
scheduled urban cooperative banks (SUCBs) reveal that 
the SUCBs may be impacted, under severe stress 
scenario. The stress tests on credit risks for NBFCs show 
that even under the severe stress scenario related to 
deterioration in asset quality, the capital adequacy ratios 
remain above the minimum required level.
Insurance and Pension Sectors
The new business premium of insurance sector 
continued to contract for the last two years. Single 
premium insurance policies account for a major part of 
the life insurance business, especially of the Life 
Insurance Corporation. New Pension System introduced 
by the Government of India with a view to develop the 
pension sector has shown signifi cant growth in the 
subscriber base and corpus.
Financial Sector Regulation and Infrastructure 
Implementation of reforms at global level
The uneven progress on implementation of agreed global 
reforms in various jurisdictions is accompanied by a 
concurrent rethinking on the architecture and desirable 
degree of financial regulation. While the needs of 
different fi nancial systems are expected to be different 
in terms of regulatory emphasis, the trends towards 
home-bias in regulation may have consequences for 
functioning of international markets, with varied effects 
on different jurisdictions.
India’s progress on reforms
India’s progress on implementation of various globally 
agreed reforms is being monitored under the framework 
of FSDC, through its Sub Committee. Inter-agency 
implementation groups have been formed, with focus 
on specifi c areas of reforms.
Basel III
India’s implementation plan for Basel III reforms is more 
stringent in terms of schedule as well as capital 
requirements, in keeping with the traditionally prudent 
approach and to make up for judgemental errors, if any, 
in computing the capital requirements. Indian banks are 
facing challenges in implementation of AMA approaches 
for computing capital charge for operational risks on 
issues related to internal governance, data availability 
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OTC Derivatives
The implementation of reforms in OTC derivative 
markets in India is being taken up in a phased manner, 
with standardisation of products and introduction of 
centralised clearing in more segments of OTC market. 
The US and European laws dealing with OTC derivatives 
reform have raised concerns over possibilities of extra 
territorial regulatory jurisdiction which may lead to 
regulatory clashes and disruptions in market activity.
Supervision of Financial Conglomerates
Significant steps towards strengthening of the 
supervision of big fi nancial groups have been taken in 
India, in recent period. The fi nancial sector regulators 
have formalised a mechanism for co-operation in 
supervision for fi nancial conglomerates and an Inter 
Regulatory Forum (IRF) has been set up, under the FSDC 
Sub Committee. Bilateral Memoranda of Understanding 
(MoU) have also been been signed with overseas 
supervisory bodies for improved cross border banking 
supervision and cooperation. Supervisory Colleges have 
been established for two big Indian banks.
Regulation of Shadow Banking
Signifi cant regulatory measures have been taken to 
address the possibilities of liquidity risks emanating 
from money market and liquid mutual funds. The 
observed circularity in fl ow of funds between banks and 
mutual funds could lead to systemic risk in times of 
liquidity stress. The regulatory gaps observed in case of 
‘collective investment schemes’ and some other 
methods through which various entities try to raise 
funds from public are being addressed through a 
coordinated approach, while seeking a more active role 
for the state governments and law enforcement agencies.
Consumer Protection
Instances of mis-selling of insurance policies, wealth 
management products and services and some other 
unhealthy practices at some banks have underscored 
the need for strengthening the consumer protection 
mechanism, adherence to KYC / AML guidelines and 
removal of certain distortions observed in the incentive 
framework.
The technology risks in times of increasing use of 
internet for various purposes, pose fresh challenges. 
The risks from obsolescence of existing technology 
platforms and outsourcing of business processes by 
banks need greater attention.
Financial Market Infrastructure
The financial market infrastructure, including the 
payment and settlement systems in the country has 
been functioning smoothly. There is a need for 
addressing the possible concentration risks from the 
exposure of the main two equity market clearing houses, 
to a common set of banks.
Systemic Risk Survey
According to the results of Reserve Bank’s latest Systemic 
Risk Survey, conducted during April – May 2013, global 
risks and domestic macro-economic risks were perceived 
to be the two most important factors affecting the 
stability of Indian fi nancial system. However, participants 
in the survey have expressed confi dence in the stability 
of the Indian fi nancial system.
 Chapter I Macro-Financial Risks
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Chapter I
Macro-Financial Risks
The gradual improvement in financial conditions that was setting in with the receding of tail risks in the global 
economy due to policy actions, has been interrupted by the recent turbulence in financial markets. Risk-off flights 
to safety triggered by apprehensions of global liquidity contracting with the Federal Reserve (Fed) indicating a 
phased withdrawal from its bond buying programme commencing later in 2013, has fuelled large scale sell off of 
financial assets in emerging markets leading to sharp downward movements in their equity, bond and currency 
markets. These developments have accentuated the spillover risks from unconventional monetary policies (UMPs) 
of advanced economy (AE) central banks posing new challenges to emerging economies.
On the domestic front, growth remains below trend and vulnerabilities on the external front have risen. The high 
current account deficit (CAD) and its financing remain stress points for the Indian economy as evident from the 
recent depreciation of the rupee on global cues. On the other hand, there are indications that inflation is moderating, 
the growth slowdown appears to be at a trough and measures taken to dampen import demand for gold are taking 
hold. Credible progress has been made on the fiscal front, which has been reflected in the upgrading of the outlook 
by credit rating agencies. Going forward, improvement in the quality of fiscal consolidation will be crucial for 
ensuring macroeconomic stability and sustainable higher growth.
Foreign institutional investors (FIIs) were net purchasers in the equity and debt markets until recently and have 
turned net sellers in June 2013. Resources raised from the equity market have remained low and activity in the 
private placement market for debt has witnessed an increase. Domestic saving as a percentage of GDP, although 
high, has fallen and this could further curtail the availability of investible resources. Corporates remain stressed as 
reflected from the lower growth in sales and profits. Given the weakness of the rupee in recent times, unhedged-
exposures may further increase the vulnerabilities of the corporate sector.
Global
Growth
1.1 Policy actions in stressed advanced economies 
have reduced tail risks globally, although fi scal drag 
in the US, austerity fatigue and incomplete fi nancial 
repair in the Euro Area, low credibility of the proposed 
structural reforms in Japan and subdued growth in 
major emerging economies continue to pose downside 
risks to a return to resilient and sustained recovery. 
Global growth remains sluggish, multi-paced and 
subdued (Chart 1.1). In view of the lack of fi scal space 
and slow traction associated with structural reforms, 
monetary policies remain the fi rst line of defense in 
the onerous job of stabilising economies.
1.2 In the US, fi rm indications of the recovery 
taking hold are evident in the Fed’s policy 
announcement made on June 19, 2013 of gradual 
withdrawal from asset purchases commencing by the 
Chart 1.1: GDP Growth and Forecasts
Source: WEO, IMF
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end of 2013. Growth in the US improved during Q1 
2013 and the Fed expects growth to be between 2.3 
per cent and 2.6 per cent in 2013. Though 
unemployment has fallen to around 7.6 per cent, it 
remains above the Fed’s comfort level. Growth, on 
the whole, in the US is expected to remain vulnerable 
to the adverse impact of the budget sequestration 
which could gradually gain pace in the months ahead. 
Future growth prospects in the US and global fi nancial 
stability hinge around a credible resolution of the US 
debt ceiling debate.1
1.3 GDP growth in the Euro Area continues to 
remain in contraction mode. Among the larger Euro 
Area economies Germany, France, Spain, Italy and 
Netherlands witnessed negative y-o-y growth in GDP 
during Q1 2013. Credit growth to the private sector 
is still shrinking. Banks are reportedly repaying funds 
borrowed under the Long Term Refi nancing Operations 
(LTRO). Unemployment has been increasing and it is 
currently high at 12.2 per cent. Youth unemployment 
at almost 24 per cent is a signifi cant risk to socio-
economic stability.
1.4 Growth in the UK has been low but positive for 
the last three quarters and is expected to be moderate 
in the near term. Higher consumer spending spurred 
by positive wealth effects brought about by 
unprecedented policy action has boosted Japan’s 
growth to an annualised 3.5 per cent during Q1 2013, 
though structural issues remain a concern. Economic 
growth in China has been lower than anticipated 
during Q1 2013 raising apprehensions that economic 
activity could slow down further. In addition, fi nancial 
stability concerns have emerged over the rapid 
increase in domestic credit in China. The other BRICS 
countries are also experiencing low growth.
Unconventional Monetary Policies - Exit
1.5 UMPs in advanced economies were undertaken 
to restore normal functioning of fi nancial market and 
to reduce the domino effects emanating from the 
global fi nancial crisis. What started as a response of 
monetary policy to address the liquidity induced 
solvency issues in the fi nancial system had been 
persisted with to counter recession and boost 
economic growth. This reduced immediate tail risks, 
though continuance of such monetary policy over a 
prolonged period may have led build up of risks 
(Box 1.1).
1.6 The market reaction to the recent Fed 
announcement could be indicative of the risks to the 
markets in the medium term as different central 
banks eventually wind up accommodative monetary 
policies. The inevitability of exit has shaken up 
markets which were lulled into comfort by the ample 
liquidity available in the system. Such bouts of 
volatility may recur frequently as tightening gets 
phased out over the next few years. The fragile 
confi dence of the markets is also evidenced by the 
strength of the market reaction. The emerging 
economies have been highly affected as capital fl ows 
have reversed impacting their currencies as also equity 
and bond markets. In general, risks from UMP exit 
stem from, among other things, timing, sequencing, 
and speed of exit. An added challenge is managing 
expectations in the face of differential economic 
conditions between and within geographies.
1.7 Bond yields in advanced economies and Euro 
Area periphery have increased sharply after the Fed’s 
June 19, 2013 announcement. The persistence of this 
trend could jeopardise the progress made by stressed 
Euro Area countries and credit growth to the private 
sector could also fall further as liquidity recedes.
1.8 Risks from UMP exit are elevated even in the 
US as increasing yields could increase the cost of funds 
and threaten recovery. Even though communication 
from the Fed stated clearly that withdrawal from bond 
purchases was not pre-determined and would depend 
upon incoming data and evolving outlook, the markets 
appear to have interpreted it to mean an imminent 
1  There was a credit rating downgrade of the US after the brinksmanship witnessed during the debt ceiling debate in 2011.
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Asset Price Bubbles : Low interest rates may have pushed 
investors into riskier activities in search of yield building 
up asset prices and encouraged corporates to build excess 
leverage. House prices in some countries have already 
witnessed sharp increases in the last few years and the 
fears of a housing bubble have re-emerged. Rapid asset 
price infl ation, particularly in the housing market, can 
lead to problems for fi nancial stability as witnessed during 
the sub-prime crisis in the US. While house prices have 
fallen in the US after the crisis and are currently below 
the pre-crisis levels, they have increased elsewhere 
(Chart 1) due to, among other reasons, search for yield 
and increase in credit.
corporates and sovereigns to undertake the necessary 
balance-sheet repairs. Macroeconomic policy, at the 
current juncture, is faced with the challenge of ensuring 
short term survival without compromising on long term 
sustainability.
Market Distortions and Mispricing of Risk: Sovereign 
bond yields have been kept artifi cially low and since 
sovereign bonds act as pricing benchmark for many 
fi nancial products there could be under-pricing of risks 
in those markets. The ability of markets to price risks can 
fall and markets may fi nd it diffi cult to function when 
unconventional policies are eventually withdrawn.
Building up of Risks: Low interest rates in the period just 
after the dot com bubble bust are believed to have led to 
excesses in fi nancial markets which eventually fuelled 
the global fi nancial crisis (Chart 3). There is, thus, a 
possibility that the current extended period of low 
interest rates may once again have led to a build-up of 
similar risks.
Box 1.1: Unconventional Monetary Policies - Risks
Singapore, Canada and Hong Kong have taken measures 
to reduce infl ation in house prices. Measures include 
reduction in the loan to value ratio, capping gross debt 
service ratio, reducing loan to value for mortgage 
refi nancing, reducing the amortisation period, tightening 
of mortgage underwriting rules, removal of interest 
absorption schemes and transaction taxes for multiple 
houses.
Adverse Selection: The issuances of non-investment grade 
corporate bonds in the US have seen a signifi cant increase 
in the recent past (Chart 2). Low interest rates could have 
infl uenced non price factors such as credit standard and 
quality of credit appraisal. The demand for non-
investment grade corporate bonds is evident from their 
downward trending yields (Chart 2).
Reduced Incentive to Repair Balance-sheets: Extended 
period of low interest rates could reduce the incentive for 
Chart 1: House Price Indices
(Q1 2009 = 100)
Chart 2: Non-Investment Grade Corporate Bonds in the US - 
Issuances and Yield
Chart 3: Yield on US Government Securities
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withdrawal of bond purchases. The gap between what 
was stated by policy makers and how that is 
interpreted by markets may lead to heightened 
volatility in the global fi nancial markets.
1.9 Uncertainty about the nature and timing of the 
exit is the dominant factor that is causing instability 
in fi nancial markets. Increasing interest rates before 
reducing the size of the bloated central bank balance-
sheets could infl ict capital losses on central banks and 
holders of fi xed income assets. Reducing balance-sheet 
size could impair the market for assets sold by central 
banks. Another issue with the eventual exit is that it 
is diffi cult to isolate the impact of individual polices 
on observed outcomes such as improvement in 
growth. Hence, it may not be possible to know which 
policy worked and which did not, or whether the 
synergies between policies worked or not. In this 
context, pulling the wrong policy lever could 
jeopardise growth and stability.
1.10 Lack of coordination among central banks in 
exiting from UMPs could increase the spillovers from 
such exits as capital fl ows could be de-stabilising. 
While it may be desirable to coordinate policy actions, 
it may not be possible to do so given the multi-paced 
nature of global growth.
Domestic
1.11 Overall macroeconomic risks facing the Indian 
economy appear to have increased since the 
publication of the previous Financial Stability Report 
(FSR) in December 2012 (Chart 1.2i). Domestic growth 
risks, external risks, and corporate vulnerabilities 
have increased, while, risks from global growth, 
domestic infl ation, fi scal stance and households have 
receded. Based on the Financial Market Stability Map2, 
risks seem to have increased in the Indian foreign 
exchange market, equity markets and banking 
sector while it has receded in the debt market 
(Chart 1.2ii).
2  For the methodology refer to Annex-2
Note: Data for External, Corporate and Household dimensions pertain to December 
2012. Data for the Financial Markets Stability Map are as on June 20, 2013. Movement 
away from the center depicts increasing risk.
Source: RBI Staff Calculation
Chart 1.2: Macro and Financial Markets Stability Map
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Growth
1.12 Against the backdrop of subdued below trend 
global growth and an uncertain global environment, 
the Indian economy is faced with several challenges, 
both internal and external. During Q3 2012-13, growth 
in the Indian economy slowed to a fi fteen quarter low 
of 4.7 per cent. Though growth improved marginally 
to 4.8 per cent during Q4 2012-13, it touched a 10 year 
low of 5 per cent for the year 2012-13. Domestic 
supply bottlenecks, policy uncertainty, consequential 
dampened investment sentiment and slackening 
external demand contributed signifi cantly to the 
slowdown though fall in infl ation has provided some 
relief. Going forward, growth has been projected to 
be relatively higher at 5.7 per cent during 2013-14 by 
the Reserve Bank of India. India is, however, expected 
to grow faster than the other BRICS nations excluding 
China (Chart 1.3). It is also reassuring that some rating 
agencies have recently revised India’s rating outlook 
to stable given the recent policy initiatives aimed at 
improving investment sentiment and growth.3
CAD and External Sector Vulnerability
1.13 Non-disruptive fi nancing of the high CAD and 
containing its size within sustainable levels has 
become the key challenge in managing the external 
sector and especially in mitigating its vulnerability to 
global shocks. In addition to the magnitude of fl ows 
needed to fi nance the CAD, the composition of fl ows, 
particularly dependence on portfolio and short-term 
debt fl ows represent an added source of concern 
(Chart 1.4). While lower commodity prices and 
moderation in gold imports could have a positive 
effect on the current account balance, high CAD in a 
sluggish economy poses difficult macroeconomic 
policy challenges.
3 Initiatives have been taken for operationalisation of 215 stalled projects involving about ` 7 trillion and implementation of projects on fast track through 
the Cabinet Committee on Investments has also been undertaken.
Chart 1.3: Growth Forecasts for the BRICS Nations
Source: WEO, IMF
Chart 1.4: Sources of Financing India’s CAD
Source: RBI
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1.14 Rise in India’s overall external debt is an added 
source of concern. Short term liabilities have also been 
increasing. The ratio of short term debt to total debt 
(both residual and original maturity) increased in Q2 
and Q3 of 2012-13 from its level in Q1. Refl ecting the 
widening CAD, net IIP-GDP ratio increased to 15.4 per 
cent at end-December 2012 from 15.1 per cent at end-
September 2012. In general, the external sector 
vulnerability indicators have shown a worsening 
trend (Table 1.1).
1.15 A number of policy measures have been taken 
in the recent past to boost investor sentiment and 
augment capital infl ows. Some of the measures are 
further liberalisation of the FDI policy4, rationalisation 
of FII debt limit allocation norms, integration and 
simplification of FII investments in Indian debt 
securities, allowing long term investors like sovereign 
wealth funds (SWFs), multilateral agencies, 
endowment funds, insurance funds, pension funds 
and foreign central banks to invest in government 
securities within the overall limit, increasing the 
limits for FII investment in government securities 
and corporate bonds, deregulating the interest rates 
on NRE deposits, increasing the ceiling of the FCNR(B) 
deposits, and increasing the all-in-cost ceiling for 
external commercial borrowings (ECB). Apart from 
Table 1.1: External Sector Vulnerability Indicators
(Per Cent)
Indicator End-Mar 
2011
End-Mar 
2012
End-June 
2012
End-Sep 
2012
End-Dec 
2012
1. Ratio of Total Debt to GDP* 17.5 19.7 19.7 19.3 20.6
2. Ratio of Short-term to Total Debt (Original Maturity) 21.2 22.6 23 23.2 24.4
3. Ratio of Short-term to Total Debt (Residual Maturity)# 42.2 42.6 42.9 43.7 44.1
4. Ratio of Short-term Debt to Reserves+ 21.3 26.6 27.8 28.7 31.1
5. Reserves Cover of Imports (in months) 9.6 7.1 7 7.2 7.1
6. External Debt (US$ billions) 305.9 345.5 349.1 365.6 376.3
7. Net International Investment Position (IIP) -209.8 -248.5 -224.1 -271.5 -282
8. IIP/GDP ratio -12.3 -13.3 -12.2 -15.1 -15.4
*: Annualised GDP at current market prices;   #: RBI Estimate;  +:Original Maturity
4  FDI policy has been liberalised further and 100 per cent FDI in single-brand retail, 51 per cent FDI in multi-brand retail and 49 per cent FDI in registered 
aviation company and power exchanges have been allowed. 
5 Provisional Data for 2012-13
these measures the government is also envisaging a 
review of the extant FDI policy to tap the immense 
potential for FDI. A number of announcements have 
been made by the government to boost exports and 
revive investors’ interests in Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs) in the Annual Supplement 2013-14 of the 
Foreign Trade policy 2009-14 released in April, 2013.
1.16 Rising gold imports have been a continuing 
concern (Chart 1.5). The share of gold in total imports 
has been increasing since 2007-08 and was close to 3 
per cent of GDP in 2012-13.5
1.17 Several policy measures aimed at reducing 
vulnerabilities arising from gold imports have been 
taken. Import duty on gold has been raised. Banks 
and NBFCs have been advised not to lend for the 
purchase of gold in any form. Banks have also been 
advised not to lend against gold coins weighing more 
than 50 grams. Import of gold on consignment basis 
has been restricted for domestic use of gold. Further, 
all Letters of Credit (LC) to be opened by Nominated 
Banks / Agencies for import of gold under all categories 
has been allowed only on 100 per cent cash margin 
basis. In addition, all imports of gold will now 
necessarily have to be on documents against payment 
(DP) basis.
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1.18 The rupee which was largely range bound 
during January – April 2013, started weakening in 
May 2013. Among other factors, strengthening US 
dollar and relatively high trade defi cit during April-
May 2013 exerted pressures on the Indian rupee.
1.19 Viewed from a different perspective, against 
the backdrop of tepid global growth, other emerging 
economies are also experiencing similar external 
sector challenges, in terms of both size of the CAD 
and pressure on the exchange rate (Chart 1.6).
Fiscal Consolidation
1.20 High fi scal defi cit has been a concern for India. 
In the post crisis period even the advanced economies 
have been pushed to relax their fi scal policies to 
support growth. In the annual budget for 2013-14 the 
Indian government has reiterated its commitment to 
fi scal consolidation and accordingly, the gross fi scal 
defi cit (GFD) as percentage of GDP has been pegged 
at 4.8 per cent for 2013-14, and the same has been 
projected to come down to 3.0 per cent by 2016-17. 
During 2012-13, the fi scal defi cit has been estimated 
to have come down to 4.9 per cent of GDP from the 
earlier estimate of 5.2 per cent.
The Government Borrowing Programme – Impact 
on Yields
1.21 The likely impact on yields and cost of 
borrowings depends upon the size of the total 
borrowing requirements, which includes refi nancing 
of the maturing debt amidst other things, such as 
credit demand from the non-government sector and 
interest rate cycle. Government’s net market 
borrowing has been pegged at about ` 5.04 trillion for 
2013-14, lower than the same at ` 5.13 trillion in 2012-
13(RE). At the same time, the trajectory of projected 
gross fi scal defi cit (GFD) given in the statement on 
“Fiscal Roadmap and Consolidation” made by Finance 
Minister in October 2012 indicates that the net market 
borrowing requirement may come down in the coming 
few years. The benefi ts of lower net borrowings, 
Chart 1.5: India’s Gold Import
Chart 1.6: Current Account Balances and Exchange Rate Movements
Source: RBI
Note: Current account balance data for 2013 is an IMF estimate. In Chart 
1.6ii +ve change indicates appreciation and -ve change depicts 
depreciation 
Source: IMF and Bloomberg
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however, are likely to be negated by the higher 
refinancing needs given the sharp rise in the 
redemption pressures over the next few years (Chart 
1.7). The buyback/ switches of government securities 
(G-Sec) will be used to reduce the redemption pressure 
and minimise the rollover risk over short-to-medium 
term. Union Budget 2013-14 has already announced 
such a programme for ` 500 billion during the current 
fi scal year.
1.22 The meticulous debt management strategy of 
the past reduced the refi nancing risk and the risks of 
a confi dence crisis signifi cantly by increasing the 
average time to maturity (ATM) of the outstanding 
portfolio of G-Secs, although the strategy could have 
imposed a trade off of higher duration risks on the 
investors. In terms of debt/GDP ratio, India’s position 
is relatively better, but sustainable level of sovereign 
debt is a country specifi c issue, and depends, among 
other things, on tax to GDP ratio. (Chart 1.8).
Equity Markets
1.23 Equity markets in India had generally 
witnessed an upward trend since mid 2012 on the 
back of FII support albeit some intermittent 
correction. The recent announcement on the 
tapering/withdrawal of bond purchase in the US had 
led to volatility in global equity markets including 
the Indian equity market. FIIs which were net 
purchasers have turned net sellers in June (up to June 
20, 2013) and there is a risk that the capital fl ows 
could reverse on a large scale if the risk off sentiment 
intensifi es causing increased volatility in the Indian 
markets. The markets have been exhibiting knee-jerk 
reactions to any news about possible exit from 
unconventional monetary policy.
1.24 Even though the secondary markets have 
witnessed strong performance until recently, there 
has been no concomitant improvement in the primary 
equity markets. The performance of the BSE IPO index 
has been relatively weaker compared to the BSE 
Sensex (Chart 1.9).
Chart 1.7: GOI Market Borrowing Programme: Redemptions
Source: RBI
Chart 1.8: Debt to GDP Ratio
Source: WEO, IMF
Chart 1.9: BSE IPO Index, BSE Sensex and NSE Nifty
(End December 2009 = 100)
Source: BSE and Bloomberg
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1.25 Weak macro-economic performance and 
subdued investment climate reduced the incentives 
for the corporate sector to raise resources via the 
equity market (Table 1.2).
1.26 As a result, the resource mobilisation activity 
has increased in the private placement market for 
corporate bonds (Chart 1.10) even as debates continue 
over the under-developed corporate debt markets 
(Box 1.2)
Chart 1.10: Resource Mobilisation via Corporate Bonds
Source: SEBI
Table 1.2: Resource Mobilisation in the Equity Market : Public and Rights Issues
Type of issue 2009-10 2010 - 11 2011 -12 2012- 13
No. of issues Amt. 
(` Billion)
No. of issues Amt.
(` Billion)
No. of issues Amt.
 (` Billion)
No. of issues Amt.
(` Billion)
Public 44 467.4 58 486.5 35 104.8 33 65.3
Rights 29 83.2 23 95.0 16 23.8 16 89.4
Total 73 550.6 81 581.6 51 128.6 49 154.7
Source: SEBI
There has been a lot of debate over the last two decades, 
more intense in the recent past, about the need for the 
existence of and developing a vibrant corporate bond 
market in India. While signifi cant efforts have gone into 
the development of corporate bond markets in India, 
substantial progress has not been made yet. The 
fundamental question that, hence, emerges is that 
whether the markets for specifi c products evolve or that 
they need to be developed. One way of tackling such a 
dilemma is to generally let the markets evolve unless the 
economic costs are more than the socio-economic benefi ts 
of having markets for such products.
When the erstwhile long term fi nancing institutions were 
either allowed to morph into full-fl edged commercial 
banks or become defunct with regard to supply of long 
term fi nancing, it was possibly believed that banks in turn 
would take the role of providing such long term resources 
to companies and projects, despite the fact that banks 
were expected to go through stringent asset liability 
matching norms. Later when the government undertook 
fi scal reforms and India’s new growth trajectory required 
massive investments in infrastructure (including power) 
for its sustenance, the need for providers of long term 
fi nance has once again been felt. It is interesting to note 
that elsewhere massive public works have been fi nanced 
seamlessly by the governments (e.g. Japan and China) 
and not through bond markets.
In India, banks predominantly provide for funding 
requirements and the debt market has catered mainly to 
the government. Banks hold government bonds in their 
portfolio because of statutory requirement and also due 
to sovereign status of bonds. While banks have been 
meeting the needs of fi nancing infrastructure (including 
power) currently, there may be some further constraints 
on such long term fi nancing once the Basel III bank 
liquidity norms such as the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) 
and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) are implemented. 
Which in turn means that in the absence of alternative 
arrangements (such as securitisation, take out fi nance 
Box 1.2: Corporate Bond Markets in India: Some Persisting Issues
(Contd....)
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etc.,), banks may not be in a position to undertake long 
term project fi nancing.
There are concerns over the provision of credit 
enhancements/guarantee by banks to corporate bond 
issuances which has been suggested as one measure to 
aid the development of bond markets in India. Credit 
enhancements will hamper the development of a 
corporate bond market on corporates’ own financial 
strength and could possibly distort the pricing mechanism. 
In addition, reliance on credit enhancements provided by 
banks will keep most of the risks in the banking system. 
Countries like China, Korea and Egypt attempted to 
develop corporate bonds markets by encouraging banks 
to offer bank guarantees, but couldn’t achieve much 
success.
A recent RBI Committee has made recommendations to 
enable banks to tap the bond market and lend long term 
at fi xed rates.6 Banks are currently permitted to raise long 
term bonds with a minimum maturity of 5 years to the 
extent of their exposure to the infrastructure sector of 
residual maturity of more than 5 years. The committee 
was of the view that banks which have not issued long 
term bonds to the extent of their said exposure to the 
infrastructure sector could utilise the room available to 
issue more of long term bonds which would help release 
resources for extending long term fi xed rate loan products. 
Another recommendation of the Committee was offering 
of fi xed rate long term loan products with periodic interest 
reset provision (every 7-10 years) in addition to the plain 
vanilla fi xed rate loan products for long tenor.
  In this context it is interesting to look at how the 
fi nancial markets are positioned in the US and the Euro 
Area (EA) in terms of bank fi nancing and bond fi nancing 
and why the practices differ widely. It has been argued 
that corporate fi nance practices are largely explained by 
the extant legal and institutional settings (La Porta et al. 
1997) and that countries like US and UK which practice 
the common law where more protection is offered to 
shareholders and creditors have seen better and faster 
growth of capital markets than civil law countries such 
as France and Germany.
In other words, other things remaining same, the level 
of legal protection to creditors is a dominant factor in 
deciding the dominance of dis-intermediated markets 
over the intermediated markets. Thus we can see 
dominant securities markets in the US, where more than 
80 per cent of the funding comes from outside the 
banking sector, and a dominant bank credit market in 
the EA. Others have argued that the legal protection 
regime alone does not explain the different practices in 
the US and the Euro Area (EA) and that the EA position 
has been explained by the relatively lower availability of 
public information about fi rms’ creditworthiness and 
higher need for the fl exibility and information acquisition 
role offered by the banks (Fiorella De Fiore and Harald 
Uhlig, 2011).
There is also a major difference between the equity and 
debt issuances by various entities. While reissue of 
equity generally is done in a way that the reissued equity 
is fungible with the original, in the case of bonds, since 
the issuance depends upon the needs of the issuer, 
prevailing interest rates etc., it is quite difficult to 
develop an identical class of bonds that can have similar 
trading liquidity as the bonds being reissued. In this 
context it may be interesting to see the emerging interest 
in corporate bonds in Europe which is developing 
because the borrowers for, obvious reasons are, replacing 
bank loans with bonds. With new Basel liquidity norms 
then, do we see a collateral benefi t to the fi nancial 
system i.e., the evolution of more vibrant bond markets? 
Or with the implementation of these new norms taking 
quite some time, is there a need to rebuild the structure 
similar to the erstwhile Developmental Financial 
Institutions in a big way to take care of the long term 
fi nancing needs?
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Saving in the Economy
1.27 Gross Domestic Saving as a proportion to GDP 
has fallen from 36.8 per cent in 2007-08 to 30.8 per 
cent in 2011-12 (Chart 1.11). A large part of this decline 
has been due to fall in fi nancial savings of households 
which have declined from 11.6 per cent of GDP to 8 
per cent of GDP over the corresponding period. Of 
late, the shift from fi nancial assets to real estate and 
gold has become stark. Infl ation, low penetration of 
banking services across the country, credibility of the 
fi nancial institutions in the wake of mis-selling of 
products and fi nancial frauds, low post tax return on 
bank deposits, negative/low real interest rates etc. 
could be some of the issues that need to be addressed 
to redirect non-fi nancial savings towards fi nancial 
savings. The government has been taking steps to 
increase the fi nancial savings in the country; one such 
step is the issuance of infl ation indexed bonds (IIBs).
Housing Market
1.28 Housing is a high value decision for most 
households in an emerging market economy. The 
housing sector is said to have linkages with about 250 
sub-sectors in the Indian economy. Given the 
importance of the housing sector in the Indian 
economy, monitoring of this sector is necessary. 
House prices in some Indian metropolitan cities have 
witnessed signifi cant increases in the recent past 
(Chart 1.12). Growth of bank credit to this sector has, 
however, been moderate7 (Chart 1.13). Further, the 
share of credit to the housing sector fell to 9.5 per 
cent as at end March 2013 from 13.3 per cent at end 
April 2007 (Chart 1.14). NPAs in the home loan 
category have also fallen in the last three years. Some 
of the concerns, however, are complete up-fronting 
of construction fi nance by home buyers to developers 
in some cases and availability of construction fi nance 
to developers at rates on par with those for home 
buyers.
Chart 1.11: Saving in the Indian Economy
Source: RBI
Chart 1.13: Growth in Bank Loans to the Housing Sector
Source: RBI
Chart 1.12: House Price Indices: India
( 2009 Q1 = 100)
Source: NHB
7  Data are provisional and relate to select 47 banks, which account for 95 per cent of total non-food credit extended by all scheduled commercial banks.
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1.29 There is a need to closely monitor this sector 
since there are indications that price to annual rent 
ratios in some parts of metro-cities like Mumbai are 
as high as 50. In addition, there is also a need to 
develop indicators other than price and volume 
indices and credit to the housing sector to gauge the 
trends in and the overall health of the sector. 
Indicators such as house price to household disposable 
income ratio, household financial obligations to 
household disposable income ratio, land price indices, 
index of construction costs, and price to rent ratio, 
information on ownership of houses, among other 
indicators need to be developed. The demand-supply 
mismatches in various price segments could also 
provide useful policy inputs.
1.30 More transparency in real estate transactions 
gains importance both from the view of consumer 
protection and prevention of money laundering. A 
law to regulate the real estate sector in order to 
improve the information fl ow, transparency, protection 
to home owners and to aid healthy and orderly growth 
is on the anvil. The proposed National Housing Bank 
(Amendment) Bill, 2012, accords powers to register 
and regulate housing finance companies to the 
Reserve Bank of India.
Liquidity: Banking and Systemic
1.31 Liquidity conditions in the banking system 
exhibited mixed trends during 2012-13 with 
alternating phases of comfortable liquidity and bouts 
of tightness. The liquidity situation eased at the 
beginning of the fi nancial year 2012-13 but overall, 
the liquidity defi cit in the banking system during the 
fi rst quarter of 2012-13 remained above the indicative 
comfort zone of the Reserve Bank (i.e., +/- 1 per cent 
of NDTL of the banking system). The situation, 
however, improved signifi cantly in the second quarter 
of 2012-13, but came under signifi cant stress during 
the third quarter, especially after mid-October 2012, 
on the back of persistently high government balances 
with the RBI coupled with rise in currency in 
circulation. The tight liquidity condition prompted 
the Reserve Bank to resume OMO purchase auctions 
Chart 1.14: Share of Credit to the Housing Sector in Non Food Credit
Source: RBI
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after a gap of over 5 months. Tight liquidity conditions 
continued in the fourth quarter of the year as well. 
On the whole, liquidity conditions in the banking 
system were much tighter in the second half of the 
year as compared to the first half. Despite tight 
liquidity conditions, government bond yields have 
come down signifi cantly. During the current fi nancial 
year, the banking system liquidity has generally 
improved from early June 2013 onwards.
1.32 However, the Systemic Liquidity Index (SLI), 
which is based on a multiple indicator approach that 
aims to capture the overall funding scenario in the 
financial system viz., the banking, non-banking 
fi nancial, the corporate sectors and liquidity in foreign 
exchange market, shows that the liquidity conditions 
improved during Q4 of 2012-13 (Chart 1.15).
Corporate Performance
1.33 The corporate sector in India has come under 
stress in the recent past. Analysed on the basis of a 
few key variables such as Sales, Profi t Margin [EBITDA 
(Earnings before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and 
Amortisation) to Sales], EBIT (Earnings before Interest, 
Tax), Interest Expenditure, Net Profi ts among other 
variables, the corporate sector shows increasing stress. 
In general, growth rate of sales and profi ts have fallen 
during Q3 2012-13 (Table 1.3).
Chart 1.15: Systemic Liquidity Indicator
Note: The SLI below zero denotes comfortable level of liquidity conditions 
in the system, whereas a level above zero implies tight liquidity conditions.
Source: RBI Staff Calculations
Table 1.3: Corporate Sector Performance
Q3FY12 Q4FY12 Q1FY13 Q2FY13 Q3FY13
Growth Rate (Y-o-Y) Percent*
Sales 19.2 15.5 13.9 11.6 9.3
Operating Profi ts (EBITDA) -4.8 -0.5 -3.5 11.3 7.8
Gross Profi ts (EBIT) 0.8 4.1 -2.6 18.9 5.5
Interest** 58.8 39.9 38.6 11.5 17.4
Net Profi ts -28.8 -7 -11.1 23.8 23.6
Ratios in Per Cent
Interest Burden 30.2 27 33 27.6 33.6
EBITDA to Sales 12.8 13.3 12.9 13.2 12.6
EBIT to Sales 11.7 12.6 11.6 12.8 11.3
Growth Rate (Q-o-Q) Percent#
Sales 6.1 9.6 -4.7 0.7 3.9
Operating Profi ts (EBITDA) 2.4 13.7 -7.5 3.5 -0.9
Gross Profi ts (EBIT) 2.9 18.5 -12.3 11.1 -8.7
Interest** 5.6 5.9 7.3 -7 11.2
Net Profi ts -15.1 51.2 -17.9 17.4 -15.3
Note: *: Refers to 2473 companies    **: Some companies report interest on net basis     # Common Companies
Source: RBI
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1.34 Indian corporates have been increasingly 
accessing international debt markets to raise resources 
(Chart 1.16). While this is presumably in response to 
improvement in international fi nancing conditions 
to take advantage of the low interest rates in the 
international markets, un-hedged exposures and an 
eventual increase in interest rates could put pressure 
on Indian corporates. Banks have already been advised 
to rigorously evaluate the risks arising out of un-
hedged foreign currency exposure of their corporate 
clients and price them in the credit risk premium 
while extending fund based and non-fund based 
credit facilities to them as this has implications for 
the asset quality of banks and their profi tability. Banks 
have also been advised to consider stipulating a limit 
on un-hedged position of corporates on the basis of 
bank’s Board approved policy.
Chart 1.16: Bond Issuances by Indian Corporates Abroad
Source: Bloomberg
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Chapter II
Financial Institutions: Soundness and Resilience
Risks to banking sector have increased since the publication of the last FSR in December 2012. The strain on asset 
quality continues, although it has shown some improvement during the quarter ended March 2013. The growth 
in credit and deposit, as well as changes in asset quality have shown significant ‘seasonality’. 
Various Banking Stability Measures, based on co-movements in banks’ equity prices, indicate that the distress 
dependencies within the banking system which were rising during last year, have shown some sign of easing. The 
inter-bank market continues to be highly interconnected as brought out by the network analysis. A simulation of 
liquidity and solvency contagion reveals that the failure of a large bank can significantly impact the banking system. 
Macro stress tests indicate that if the current macroeconomic conditions persist, the credit quality of commercial 
banks could deteriorate further. However, the comfortable position on the banks’ capital adequacy front has provided 
resilience as shown by the top-down stress testing exercises on various risks.
The results of the bottom up stress tests (sensitivity analysis) carried out by select banks, also testified to the general 
resilience of the banks to different kinds of shocks.
The new business premium of insurance sector continued to contract for the last two years. Single premium insurance 
policies account for a major part of the life insurance business especially of the Life Insurance Corporation. Persistency 
rates also continue to cause concern in life insurance business. New Pension System introduced by the Government 
of India with a view to develop the pension sector has shown steep growth in the subscriber base and corpus.
Assessment of Risks - Banking Sector
2.1 The risks to the banking sector, as at end March 
2013 have increased marginally since the publication 
of previous FSR1. The Banking Stability Indicator, 
which combines the impact on all major risk 
1  December 2012 - with reference to data as at end September 2012.
dimensions, shows an increase in vulnerability in the 
banking sector since September 2010 (Chart 2.1). An 
analysis of the components contributing to banking 
stability shows that tight liquidity, deteriorating asset 
quality and reducing soundness are the major 
Note: Increase in indicator value shows lower stability.
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns and Staff Calculations.
Chart 2.1: Banking Stability Indicator and Map
Note: Away from the centre signifi es increase in risk.
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contributors to the decline in stability of the banking 
system. This comparative position is refl ected in the 
Banking Stability Map also (Chart 2.1).
Distress Dependencies and Interconnectedness 
Banking Stability Measures (BSMs) – Distress 
Dependency Analysis
2.2 The fi nancial system is conceptualised as a 
portfolio of a specifi c group of banks2, for the purpose 
of modelling distress dependencies, based on the 
premise that during times of distress, the fi nancial 
position of banks tend to decline concurrently 
through direct and / or indirect links. These links 
mainly include mark-to-market asset values, interbank 
lending and information asymmetries.
2.3 The Banking Stability Measures (BSMs), based 
on the distress dependency structure among banks, 
use the technique of Banking System’s Portfolio 
Multivariate Density (BSMD)3 (Segoviano and 
Goodhart, 2009). The BSMD technique takes into 
account inter-dependent structure of distress, which 
captures both linear and non-linear distress 
dependencies among the banks in the system and 
provides a set of tools to measure: (i) common distress 
of the banks in a system and (ii) distress between 
specifi c banks. The BSMD technique uses both the 
individual and joint asset value movements of the 
portfolio of banks and the BSMD is derived from 
Probabilities of Distress (PoDs)4 of the banks, observed 
empirically, based on 99 per cent Value at Risk (VaR) 
of banks’ daily equity price return.
2.4 The BSMs presented in this section comprise 
of the Banking Stability Index, Toxicity Index and 
Vulnerability Index. While the Banking Stability Index 
depicts the common distress of the banks in a system, 
the Toxicity and Vulnerability Indices depict the 
distress between specifi c banks.
Common distress in the system
2.5 The probability of distress of the entire banking 
system, as measured by Joint Probability of Distress 
(JPoD) has registered a marginal decline during last 
six months. Trends in the Banking Stability Index 
(BSI), that measures the expected number of banks 
that could become distressed given that at least one 
bank has become distressed, showed an upward trend 
(deteriorating conditions) from December 2010 till 
September 2012. A marginal decline in BSI registered 
since September 2012 indicating some sign of easing 
in interdependencies among banks, has again 
reversed in February 2013 (Chart 2.2). It may be 
observed the common distress in the system 
measured by JPoD and BSI is signifi cantly lower at 
present, than the distress observed during the peak 
of the global fi nancial crisis. The JPoD and the BSI not 
only take account of individual banks’ probabilities 
2  Study is based on15 major banks have been selected for which equity price data are available. These represent about 60 per cent of total assets of 
scheduled commercial banks in India.
3  For details please refer to the Annex-2.
4  The PoDs for banks were estimated from their equity return distributions. Under this approach, fi rst, banks’ historical distributions of equity returns 
are estimated. Then, the probability of returns falling under the historical worse 1 per cent of the cases (99 VaR) is quantifi ed. Therefore, the PoD of a 
specifi c bank represents the probability that the bank’s equity return would fall in the tail region (historical one percentile).
Chart 2.2: Movements of JPoD and BSI
Source: Bloomberg data and RBI Staff Calculations
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of distress, but these measures also embed banks’ 
distress dependence. Therefore, these measures may 
experience larger and nonlinear increases than those 
experienced by the PoDs of individual banks.
Distress relationship among banks
2.6 The Toxicity Index (TI) is the average probability 
that a bank under distress may cause distress to 
another bank in the system, whereas, Vulnerability 
Index (VI) is the average probability of a bank coming 
under distress given distress in other banks in the 
system. Both the indices have shown a co-movement 
with that of BSI indicating signs of easing toxicity and 
vulnerability of the selected banks (Chart 2.3).
Network Analysis5
The interbank market
2.7 The Indian Financial System is bank dominated. 
The market for interbank exposures (exposures 
between SCBs), stood at `9.8 trillion as at end March 
2013. The public sector banks with 62 per cent share 
of the market comprised the largest segment, followed 
by the foreign banks whose share of the market was 
around 28 per cent.
2.8 Average interbank lending as a percentage of 
total assets stood at around 11 per cent while inter 
bank borrowing as a percentage of total outside 
liabilities stood at around 13 per cent. However, the 
exposure was signifi cantly higher for some banks, 
making them vulnerable to solvency and liquidity 
shocks arising out of any instability in the overall 
banking system (Charts 2.4 and 2.5).
5  The analysis of the fi nancial system is based on a sample size of 165 institutions. This includes all the SCBs and select Insurance Companies, Asset 
Management Companies, Urban Cooperative Banks, NBFCs and specialized fi nancial institutions. The Network model used in the analysis has been 
developed by Professor Sheri Markose (University of Essex) and Dr. Simone Giansante (Bath University) in collaboration with the Financial Stability 
Unit, Reserve Bank of India.
Chart 2.4: Lending in the interbank market 
Chart 2.3: Distress between specifi c banks 
Source: RBI Staff Calculation
Source: Bloomberg data and RBI Staff Calculations
(Per cent of total assets)
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2.9 An analysis of the network of interbank call 
money market indicates a low level of tiering6 
compared to the network of interbank exposures. The 
size of the market amounted to ` 213 billion as at end 
March 2013 and its network structure effectively 
demonstrates only two tiers with the banks in the 
core being the major lenders in the system. The 
structure of the network in the call money market 
indicates that the failure of any of the lenders in the 
inner core will have signifi cant implications for the 
liquidity of the market.
2.10 The network of the interbank Certifi cate of 
Deposit (CD) exposures displays a higher degree of 
interconnectedness as compared to the call money 
market, though the level of tiering is low in this 
market as well. The connectivity ratio7 of the 
interbank CD market stood at 9 per cent, whereas the 
same ratio for the interbank call market was just above 
1 per cent (Chart 2.6 and 2.7). These ratios are well 
below the connectivity ratio for the total interbank 
market which is around 25 per cent.
The Non-Banking Financial Sector
2.11 In the broader fi nancial system, the main non-
bank institutions are the Asset Management 
Companies and the Insurance Companies. The 
combined investment/lending by these two sectors 
amounts to over `6.5 trillion, most of which is to 
banks. The exposure of these entities to the banking 
system makes them potentially vulnerable to solvency 
shocks arising from any instability in the banking 
system.
2.12 The business models of Non-Banking Financial 
Companies (NBFCs)8 make them largely reliant on 
banks for their liquidity requirements. Within the 
fi nancial system, they are the second largest borrowing 
sector, after the banking sector. Total borrowing by 
Chart 2.5: Borrowing in the interbank market
Chart 2.6: Network of the interbank call money market
Source: RBI Staff Calculation
Source: RBI Staff Calculation
6  For details on tiering and Network Structures, please refer to the Annex-2. 
7  Connectivity ratio is measured as the actual number of connections to all total possible connections in a network.
8  Sample size includes 35 top (both deposit taking and non deposit taking) NBFCs in the country. 
Chart 2.7: Network of the interbank CD market
Source: RBI Staff Calculation
(Per cent of total outside liabilities)
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this sector is close to ` 3 trillion, while the investment/
lending by NBFCs stood at around `1.2 trillion. The 
bulk of these exposures are fund based. The reliance 
of the NBFCs to banks makes them vulnerable to 
liquidity shocks arising from any instability in the 
banking system (Chart 2.8).
Contagion Analysis
2.13 Contagion analysis with network tools is used 
to assess distress in the banking system due to 
insolvency of the net borrowers. The exercise is a 
stress test which reckons the impact of failure of a 
net borrower in the system without taking cognizance 
of the probability of failure of a bank. It is important 
to note that the trigger for contagion is the failure of 
a major player, the probability of such failure being 
subject to macroeconomic factors and its own fi nancial 
position. In the well regulated Indian banking system, 
the probability of such failure is a tail event, especially 
since the prudential regulator is also in charge of 
systemic risk.
2.14 The extent of contagion caused by distress in 
a bank will vary depending on the criteria that is used 
to determine the condition under which a bank is 
treated as ‘distressed’, with more stringent distress 
conditions leading to a more severe contagion results. 
This is illustrated in the table below which shows the 
contagion impact using different distress conditions 
(Table 2.1).
Liquidity contagion9 in the fi nancial system
2.15 An analysis of the three main sectors in the 
fi nancial system, i.e. the banking sector, the insurance 
sector and the mutual funds sector reveals that the 
failure of any institution which has large lending 
position will have signifi cant downstream impact. As 
discussed in paragraph 2.11 above, the insurance 
companies and the asset management companies are 
fund providers in the fi nancial system and any failure 
can cause severe liquidity stress in the system 
Chart 2.8: Network of the Financial System
Source: RBI Staff Calculation
9  Please refer the Annex-2
Table 2.1: Contagion due to one of the fi ve largest borrower 
banks are under distress
Banks is under 
distress if leverage 
ratio falls below 3 
per cent
Banks is under 
distress if it loses 
more than 25 per 
cent of its capital
Banks is under 
distress if core 
capital ratio falls 
below 6 per cent
No. of 
banks 
becoming 
distressed
Per 
cent of 
capital 
loss 
to the 
banking 
system
No. of 
banks 
becoming 
distressed
Per 
cent of 
capital 
loss 
to the 
banking 
system
No. of 
banks 
becoming 
distressed
Per 
cent of 
capital 
loss 
to the 
banking 
system
A 3 7.5 24 20.2 13 20.2
B 3 11.9 14 18.0 11 18.0
C 1 5.6 7 7.6 3 7.6
D 2 8.0 7 10.0 3 10.0
E 1 6.0 2 6.6 2 6.6
Source: RBI Staff Calculations
Trigger
Banks
Distress
Criteria
Table 2.2: Liquidity contagion in the fi nancial system if one of the 
large lenders/investors is under distress
Trigger 
Institution
Per cent of 
capital loss to 
the fi nancial 
system
Per cent of 
liquidity reserve 
loss to the 
fi nancial system
No. of 
institutions 
becoming 
distressed
A 18.2 103.6 49
B 12.4 70.4 30
C 9.4 53.4 30
D 7.3 41.8 18
E 7.0 40.2 19
Source: RBI Staff Calculation
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(Table 2.2). A stylised representation of how a liquidity 
contagion will play out is depicted in Chart 2.9
Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCBs)
Trends in Credit and Deposit
2.16 The SCBs recorded lower credit growth on y-o-y 
basis at 15.1 per cent in March 2013 than in September 
2012 (15.8 per cent) and March 2012 (16.9 per cent), 
respectively. However, the y-o-y deposits growth of 
all SCBs increased marginally to 14.4 per cent in March 
2013 from 14.3 per cent of the September 2012 
(Chart 2.10). Despite the lower credit growth during 
March 2013, the Credit-Deposit (C-D) ratio of SCBs 
improved to 76.5 per cent during the quarter from 
74.3 per cent in September 2012, indicating greater 
share of credit in their incremental assets.
2.17 At the bank-group level, except foreign banks, 
all the other bank-groups recorded lower credit growth 
and higher deposit growth in March 2013 compared 
to September 2012. The credit growth of foreign banks 
increased sharply to 14.6 per cent in March 2013 from 
6.5 per cent in September 2012, whereas, the deposit 
growth of this bank-group declined to 4.0 per cent in 
March 2013 from 8.2 per cent in September 2012. The 
public sector banks registered credit and deposits 
growth of 14.2 per cent and 14.0 per cent in March 
2013, respectively (Chart 2.10).
Seasonality in Credit and Deposit activities of 
Indian banks
2.18 It can be observed that the banks’ performance 
on credit delivery and deposit mobilisation improves 
during the last quarter of the fi nancial year. The asset 
quality indicators also show an improvement during 
the last quarter of fi nancial year. While there may be 
some business reasons for such a phenomenon, it is 
widely perceived that the banks adopt various 
10  The black ball in the centre represents the initial trigger institution. Consequent to this trigger institution coming under duress, there is a liquidity 
stress in the system. Red triangles are the institutions which even after using its liquidity buffers and callable assets cannot tide over the stress. The 
green balls from which further contagion emanates (represented by an arrow) are the institutions which overcomes the stress using both its buffers and 
callable assets. The green balls which do not cause any contagion are the institutions which prevail over the stress by just using their liquidity buffer.
Chart 2.9: Liquidity Contagion10 in the Financial System
Chart 2.10: Credit and Deposit Growth: Y-o-Y Basis
Source: RBI Staff Calculation
Note: Public sector banks (PSBs), new private banks (NPBs), old private banks 
(OPBs) and foreign banks (FBs)
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns 
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strategies to improve their performance for the year-
end balance sheets. In a competitive scenario, the 
incentive structures could be driving the banks 
towards ‘window-dressing’ practices.
2.19 An empirical analysis of seasonal factors of 
credit, deposit, slippage ratio, recovery and write-off11 
has been carried out to understand the behavioral 
aspects. The fi nding of this analysis shows that, credit 
and deposit, both have signifi cant seasonality, which 
pulls them up during the last quarter of fi nancial year 
(Chart 2.11).
2.20 The q-o-q growth in credit and deposit of SCBs 
increased to 7.3 per cent and 6.9 per cent in March 
2013 from 4.6 per cent and 2.1 per cent of the previous 
quarter, respectively. However, the q-o-q growth in 
seasonally adjusted credit and deposit declined to 3.4 
per cent and 2.9 per cent in March 2013 from 3.7 per 
cent and 3.2 per cent of the previous quarter, 
respectively. This shows that the improved credit and 
deposit growth during March 2013 was largely due to 
the seasonal factor (Chart 2.12).
Chart 2.12: Seasonality in Credit and Deposit
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns and Staff Calculations
11  Findings on seasonality in the asset quality are discussed in the Para No. 2.35. 
12  Seasonal Factors are estimated using X12-ARIMA method.
Note: In the absence of seasonality in a variable, seasonal factors of all the four 
quarter should be 100(i.e. average). If seasonal factor of a quarter is above 100, 
it shows that because of seasonality the value of the variable in that quarter is 
higher, whereas, if it is below 100, it shows that seasonal factor is pulling the 
variable down.
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns and Staff Calculation 
Chart 2.11: Seasonal Factors12 of Credit and Deposit
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Sectoral Deployment of Credit
2.21 There were no major changes in the overall 
distribution of sectoral credit allocation over the last 
two years. The trends in credit fl ow to some select 
sectors like Agriculture, Exports, Medium and Small 
Enterprises (MSE), and NBFCs have been studied in 
this section. These sectors account for around 40 per 
cent of the total bank credit as at end March 2013 
(Chart 2.13). The sectors under ‘Others’ include, 
advances to central and state governments, food 
credit, advances to public sector units, etc.
2.22 The growth in the credit to the agriculture 
declined sharply to 12.5 per cent in March 2013 from 
29.8 per cent of September 2012.
2.23 Export credit continues to contract, an issue 
that has been engaging the attention of policy makers 
in the light of increasing trade defi cit. The Reserve 
Bank has been initiating measures from time to time 
to direct credit to the sector at competitive rates. The 
recent report of a technical committee13 constituted 
by the Reserve Bank has recommended several 
measures to improve the fl ow of credit to export 
sector, reduce transaction costs and incentivise 
exports & export fi nancing.
2.24 Credit growth to MSE sector, which has a large 
potential for employment generation, increased 
signifi cantly to 25.6 per cent in March 2013 from 15.5 
per cent and 7.6 per cent in September 2012 and 
March 2012, respectively. The increase in credit 
growth of MSE sector registered during the quarter 
needs to be sustained, for improving the overall credit 
deployment for this sector. The credit growth to retail 
housing also increased to 16.4 per cent from 13.0 per 
cent in September 2012 (Chart 2.14).
2.25  Bank credit to NBFCs recorded a decline in 
growth on y-o-y basis to 13.6 per cent in March 2013 
from 32.5 per cent and 42.8 per cent recorded in 
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 2.13: Allocation of Credit – Select Sectors
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns 
Chart 2.14: Y-o-Y Credit Growth - Select Sectors
13  Report of the Technical Committee on Services/Facilities to Exporters.
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September 2012 and March 2012, respectively. This 
decline is attributed to lower demand for auto & 
consumer loans, stricter norms on lending against 
gold, withdrawal of priority sector status for some 
loans given by SCBs to NBFCs for on-lending to specifi c 
purposes, etc.
Soundness
Capital Adequacy
2.26 The system level Basel II Capital to Risk 
Weighted Assets Ratio (CRAR) improved slightly to 
13.8 per cent as at end March 2013 from 13.6 per cent 
as at end September 2012 (Chart 2.15). The y-o-y 
growth in risk weighted assets (RWA) of SCBs was at 
17.1 per cent in March 2013 compared to 14.5 per 
cent in September 2012. The rise in capital was 
attributed mainly to increase in Tier I capital.
2.27  At the bank-group level, public sector banks 
continued to register the lowest CRAR at 12.4 per cent 
in March 2013 followed by old private banks 
(Chart 2.15).
Leverage
2.28 The Tier I leverage ratio14 of all SCBs increased 
to 6.4 per cent in March 2013 from 6.1 per cent and 
6.2 per cent of September 2012 and March 2012, 
respectively, due to the higher Tier I capital growth 
relative to the growth in the total assets (Chart 2.16).
2.29 An analysis of the bank-wise leverage15 was 
carried out, in conjunction with the trends in the 
riskiness of their assets. The leverage was measured 
as total assets to capital (using Tier I as well as Tier I 
& II), while the ratio of RWA to total assets was taken 
as an indicator of the degree of riskiness of the assets 
portfolio. It has been observed that the banks which 
have lower ratio of  RWA to total assets tend to have 
a higher leverage (Chart 2.17).
Chart 2.15: Capital Adequacy
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns 
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns 
Chart 2.16: Leverage Ratio of SCBs
14 Tier I leverage ratio is defi ned as the ratio of Tier I capital to Total Assets, under Basel III. Higher the ratio, lower the vulnerability.
15 The usage of leverage here is different from the leverage ratio (as defi ned under Basel III). The leverage is taken as the ratio of total assets to capital.
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Estimation of Losses, Provisioning and Capital 
Adequacy
2.30 At present, banks in India follow ‘incurred loss 
model’ to recognise credit losses of banks. Under the 
approach, provision is made for loans, only on 
occurrence of an identifi able credit event. The timing 
and measurement of losses are, therefore, based on 
estimating losses that have been incurred as on the 
reporting date. This model does not permit recognising 
credit losses based on events that are expected to 
occur in the future and hence it is not a forward 
looking approach. As suggested by the BCBS, there is 
a need to move towards a new accounting standard, 
Table 2.3: Estimated Losses of SCBs  
(Per cent to Total Advances)
End-Quarter Expected Loss Unexpected Loss Expected Shortfall
Baseline Medium Stress Severe Stress Baseline Medium Stress Severe Stress Baseline Medium Stress Severe Stress
Mar-13* 2.0 - - 6.9 - - 7.0 - -
Sep-13 2.3 2.5 2.8 7.2 7.8 8.5 7.3 8.0 8.7
Mar-14 2.1 2.6 3.1 7.0 7.9 8.8 7.1 8.0 9.0
* Estimation of losses for the quarter ended Mar-13 is based on the observed numbers.
Source: Supervisory Returns and Staff Calculations
which is based on the concept of expected losses (EL) 
and unexpected losses (UL) to measure the potential 
losses in a credit portfolio (Box 2.1). Banks are 
expected to cover the UL by capital and EL by 
provisions. The EL is generally derived as the mean 
of the credit loss distribution and has a forward-
looking element16.
2.31 The estimated EL of SCBs at system level was 
around 2.0 per cent of total advances as at end March 
2013 and is expected to rise to 2.3 per cent by 
September 2013 under baseline scenario (Table 2.3). 
The present level of total provisions17 being 
maintained by the SCBs at 2.6 per cent of total 
16  Internationally, it is recommended to use estimated losses (EL & UL) approach for the purpose of making provisions and capital, for the next one 
year. For this purpose, PD is derived based on annual slippage. As the purpose of this study is to judge the adequacy of provisioning and capital levels 
being maintained by SCBs and not to estimate the required level of provisions and capital to be maintained for next one year, the PDs being used here 
is based on GNPA.
17  Total Provisions include provisions for credit losses, risk provision for standard advances and provisions for restructured standard advances.
Chart 2.17:  Bank-wise Leverages and their Riskiness of Assets-March 2013
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns and Staff Calculations
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advances as at end March 2013, is adequate under 
the baseline scenario. The EL may further increase 
to 3.1 per cent under severe stress conditions by 
March 2014, leaving a gap between the present 
provisioning level and EL under heightened adverse 
macroeconomic conditions18. Therefore, it would be 
prudent for the SCBs to increase their provisioning 
from the present levels. On the other hand, the UL 
and expected shortfall of SCBs are estimated to be 
around 7.0 per cent and 7.1 per cent of total advances 
Expected Loss, Unexpected Loss and Expected 
Shortfall of Scheduled Commercial Banks in India
The EL is generally derived as the mean of the credit 
loss distribution and has forward-looking element as it 
is capable of incorporating ‘through-the-cycle’ view of 
probability of default.
A pictorial presentation of loss distribution depicting EL, 
UL and expected shortfall is given in the chart below.
These losses were estimated as: Loss = PD X LGD X EAD
Where, EAD = Exposure at Default, is the total 
advances of the banking system. EAD 
includes only on-balance sheet items 
as PD was derived only for on balance 
sheet exposures.
 LGD = Loss Given Default. Under baseline 
scenario, the average LGD was taken as 
60 per cent as per the RBI guidelines on 
‘Capital Adequacy – The IRB Approach 
to Calculate Capital Requirement for 
Credit Risk’. LGD was taken at 65 per 
cent and 70 per cent under medium 
and severe macro-economic conditions, 
respectively.
 PD = Probability of Default. PD was defi ned as 
gross non-performing advances to total 
advances ratio. Because of unavailability 
of data on number of default accounts, 
the size of default accounts (i.e. NPA 
amount) has been used for derivation of 
PDs.
The above losses viz., EL, UL and ES, were estimated 
by using a simulated PD distribution. As a fi rst step; an 
empirical distribution of the PD was estimated using 
Kernel Density Estimate, second; using the empirically 
estimated probability density function, 20000 random 
numbers were drawn based Monte Carlo Simulation 
and fi nally, for calculation of expected loss, unexpected 
loss and expected shortfall, PDs were taken as average 
PD, 99.9 per cent VaR of PD and average PD beyond 99.9 
per cent loss region, respectively.
Box 2.1: Estimation of Losses
Chart : Loss Distribution of Credit Portfolio
Expected ShortfallUnexpected LossExpected Loss
The following standard defi nitions have been used for 
estimation of these losses:
 Expected Loss (EL): The EL is the average credit loss that 
the banking system expects from their credit exposure.
 Unexpected Loss (UL): The UL at 100(1-α) per cent-level 
of signifi cance is the loss may occur at the α-quantile of 
the loss distribution.
 Expected Shortfall (ES): When the distributions of loss 
(Z) are continuous, expected shortfall at the 100(1-α) 
per cent confi dence level ( ESα (Z) ) is defi ned as, ESα 
(Z) = E[Z ǀ ZVaRα (Z)]. Hence, Expected shortfall is the 
conditional expectation of loss given that the loss is 
beyond the VaR level.
18  The stress scenarios have been defi ned in Table 2.6 under macro-stress tests (Para No. 2.46).
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respectively for the quarter ended March 2013. The 
corresponding losses may further rise to 8.8 per cent 
and 9.0 per cent as at end March 2014 under severe 
stress scenario. The UL and expected shortfall are 
less than the Tier I capital to total advances ratio of 
12.1 per cent maintained by SCBs as at the end of 
March 2013.
Asset Quality
2.32 The asset quality of SCBs, which was 
deteriorating continuously, recorded an improvement 
in March 2013 quarter. The Gross Non-Performing 
Advances (GNPA) ratio of SCBs improved to 3.4 per 
cent as at end March 2013 against 3.6 per cent as at 
end September 2012. The net NPA ratio declined to 
1.4 per cent as at end March 2013 from 1.6 per cent 
as at end September 2012. This decline in NPA was 
attributed to the lower slippage, improved recovery 
and higher write-off during the quarter (Chart 2.18). 
Change in classifi cation for restructured advances 
with effect from April 1, 2015 may have some adverse 
impact on the NPAs, unless banks take preventive 
measures in this regard.
2.33 At the bank-group level, the GNPAs of public 
sector banks was highest and stood at 3.8 per cent 
as at end March 2013, followed by that of the foreign 
19  Quarterly recovery ratio is defi ned as percentage recovery during the quarter to the NPA at the beginning of the quarter.
20  Quarterly write-off ratio is defi ned as percentage write-offs during the quarter to the NPA at the beginning of the quarter.
Chart 2.18: Assets Quality Indicators
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
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banks. The quarterly slippage ratio of public sector 
banks declined to 0.5 per cent for the quarter ended 
March 2013 from 0.8 per cent recorded during 
September 2012. Quarterly slippage of foreign banks 
increased to 0.3 per cent and 0.1 per cent for the 
corresponding periods. The old private banks 
registered highest quarterly recovery at 21.2 per cent 
during quarter ended March 2013 followed by the 
public sector banks at 9.1 per cent. All the bank 
groups, except new private banks, recorded higher 
write-off during the quarter ended March 2013 as 
compared to quarter ended September 2012 
(Chart 2.18).
Seasonality in Asset Quality
2.34 An empirical seasonal analysis shows that 
during the March quarter, the slippages of standard 
advances are more than the average slippages of all 
four quarters, but, the GNPA ratio declines during this 
quarter mainly because of the higher recovery and 
write-off of bad loans observed during the last quarter 
(March) of fi nancial year (Chart 2.19).
Restructuring of loans
2.35 The restructured standard loans of SCBs as 
proportion of their total loans have registered a 
marginal decline from 5.9 per cent as at end September 
2012 to 5.7 per cent as at end March 2013. Among the 
bank groups, this ratio, at 7.1 per cent, was the highest 
for the public sector banks followed by old private 
banks. (Chart 2.20).
2.36 Industry and services sector account for a 
major proportion of restructured loans of the 
banking sector. As these sectors have a relatively 
higher share of total bank credit, the trends in 
restructuring of loans to these sectors make a bigger 
impact on the health of the banking sector. Within 
the industrial sector, a few sub-sectors, namely; Iron 
& Steel, Textile, Infrastructure, Power generation and 
Telecommunications; have become a cause of concern 
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns and Staff Calculations
Chart 2.19: Asset Quality - Seasonal Factors21
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 2.20:  Restructured Standard Loans to Total Loans Ratio
21  Seasonal Factors are estimated using X12-ARIMA method.
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in recent times. In case of sectors like Aviation, though 
the incidence of restructuring is high, its share of 
bank credit is relatively low (Chart 2.21).
2.37 The increasing incidence of forbearance in the 
banking system especially in Europe has emerged as 
a concern in recent times against the backdrop of a 
slowdown in the global economy. Forbearance refers 
to the act of granting a concession to the borrower by 
the lender (bank), in view of some economic or legal 
reasons related to temporary fi nancial diffi culties 
being faced by the borrower. While forbearance is 
essential and good in the case of viable ventures, 
forbearance to avoid classifi cation as NPL or simply 
keeping zombie companies alive, leads to ineffi cient 
allocation of resources and eventual problems for the 
lender.
2.38 The previous FSR had covered the unhealthy 
trends in restructuring of advances by banks in India, 
especially the public sector banks. In this context the 
recommendations of a Reserve Bank Working Group22 
to review the restructured loans have been accepted 
and the extant asset classifi cation benefi ts available 
on restructuring will be withdrawn effective from 
April 1, 2015 - with the exception of provisions related 
to changes in date of commencement of commercial 
operation (DCCO) in respect of infrastructure and 
non-infrastructure project loans.
2.39 The Working Group had also recommended 
that, till such time the regulatory forbearance on asset 
classification is dispensed with, the provision 
requirement on such accounts should be increased 
from the present 2 per cent to 5 per cent, in order to 
prudently recognise the inherent risks in restructured 
standard assets in the interregnum. The Reserve Bank, 
therefore has increased23 the provision on restructured 
standard accounts to 2.75 per cent from 2.00 per cent. 
The provision has been increased to 5 per cent in 
respect of new restructured standard accounts (fl ow) 
with effect from June 1, 2013 and in a phased manner 
for the stock of restructured standard accounts as on 
March 31, 2013. 
Profi tability
2.40 The profi tability of all SCBs, measured by return 
on assets (RoA) and return on equity (RoE) declined 
to 1.0 per cent and 12.8 per cent in March 2013 from 
1.1 per cent and 13.4 per cent in March 2012, 
respectively. The lower growth in profi t after tax (PAT) 
was mainly attributed to the lower y-o-y growth in 
net interest income (NII) at 11.0 per cent in March 
22  Report of the Working Group to review the existing prudential guidelines on restructuring of advances by banks/fi nancial institutions.
23  http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notifi cation/PDFs/CDRS30052013F.pdf
Chart 2.21: Stressed Loans : Sector-wise – March 2013
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
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2013 against 15.8 per cent in the previous year. The 
decrease in NII is accompanied by a reduction in the 
net interest margin (NIM) to 3.0 per cent in March 
2013 from 3.1 per cent in the previous two years. The 
SCBs have seen a faster growth in their other operating 
income (OOI), with the y-o-y growth increasing to 13.8 
per cent in March 2013 from 7.4 per cent in the 
previous year (Table 2.4).
2.41 The contribution of NII to total operating 
income(TOI) declined marginally to 72.1 per cent in 
2012-13 from 72.6 per cent in the previous year, 
whereas, contribution of OOI to TOI increased to 27.9 
per cent in 2012-13 from 27.4 per cent in the previous 
year. This rise in the contribution of OOI to total 
income was attributed to the higher contribution 
recorded from security trading (10.5 per cent in 2012-
13 against 3.6 per cent in the previous year) and 
miscellaneous income (Table 2.5).
2.42 Among the major bank groups, the contribution 
of NII to the TOI is highest in the case of the public 
sector banks followed by old private banks; whereas 
the contribution of OOI to TOI is highest in the case 
of new private banks followed by foreign banks 
(Chart 2.22).
2.43 Another emerging area that is adding to banks’ 
OOI is commission on account of insurance business. 
For the year 2011-12, banks accounts for ` 19.9 Billion, 
Table 2.4: Profi tability of SCBs
(Per cent)
Return 
on As-
sets
Return 
on 
Equity
PAT 
Growth
Net In-
terest 
Income 
Growth
Other 
Oper-
ating 
Income 
Growth
NIM24 Spread25
Mar-09 1.1 14.5 23.3 24.4 24.0 2.7 3.5
Mar-10 1.0 12.9 4.3 14.8 3.1 2.7 3.5
Mar-11 1.1 13.6 23.6 34.6 0.5 3.1 3.8
Mar-12 1.1 13.4 14.6 15.8 7.4 3.1 3.8
Mar-13 1.0 12.8 12.8 11.0 13.8 3.0 3.3
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Table 2.5 Income components of SCBs - Select Ratios 
(Per cent)
Net Interest 
Income to 
TOI
Other 
Operating 
Income to TOI
Risk 
Provisions to 
TOI
Fee income to 
OOI
Profi t/(Loss) 
on Forex 
operations to 
OOI
Profi t/(Loss) 
on securities 
trading to OOI
Dividend 
income to 
OOI
Miscellaneous 
income to 
OOI
Mar-09 62.2 37.8 12.3 47.3 16.9 21.1 2.4 12.3
Mar-10 64.7 35.3 12.6 51.1 12.8 18.0 2.7 15.5
Mar-11 71.1 28.9 14.3 57.7 18.3 4.0 3.2 16.7
Mar-12 72.6 27.4 17.0 59.5 18.7 3.6 3.1 15.1
Mar-13 72.1 27.9 16.8 55.1 15.4 10.5 2.5 16.4
Note: TOI-Total Operating Income; OOI- Other Operating Income.
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
24  Net Interest Margin(NIM): NIM of SCBs is derived by taking weighed average of bank wise NIM, weighted by asset size.
25  Spread between Yield on Advances & Bills Discounted and Cost of Customer Deposits.
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 2.22: Composition of Total Operating Income: Bank-group wise
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which is 9.7 per cent of total commission paid by 
insurers (life as well as non-life) and 2.4 per cent of 
the OOI of all SCBs (Chart 2.23).
2.44 The contribution of public sector banks as a 
bank-group, to NII and OOI of all SCBs, declined to 
66.3 per cent and 57.5 per cent in March 2013 from 
69.3 per cent and 58.1 per cent in the previous year, 
respectively. The contribution of new private banks 
to NII and OOI of all SCBs increased to 18.7 per cent 
and 26.5 per cent in March 2013 from 16.3 per cent 
and 24.6 per cent in the previous year, respectively 
(Chart 2.24).
2.45 The present levels of NIM and spread of the 
SCBs in India as a whole, may indicate that there is 
scope for banks to improving their efficiency. A 
comparison of NIM, for the three years through 2011, 
of select countries shows that NIM of banks in India 
is comparable to that of BRICS countries (Chart 2.25).
Source: IRDA and RBI Supervisory Returns
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 2.23: Income to SCBs from Commission of Insurance Companies Chart 2.24: Contribution of Bank-groups to NII and OOI of SCBs
Note: data on NIM for the select countries (except India) is available till 
2011 only.
Source: Financial Development and Structure Dataset (updated April 
2013), World Bank
Chart 2.25: NIM of Select Countries
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Resilience - Stress Tests
2.46 The resilience of the Indian banking system to 
macroeconomic shocks was tested through a series 
of macro stress tests for credit risk at system, bank-
group and sectoral levels. These tests are based on 
baseline scenario and two adverse (medium and 
severe) risk scenarios (Table 2.6). The adverse 
scenarios were derived based on up to 1 standard 
deviation for medium risk and 1.25 to 2.0 standard 
deviations for severe risk (10 years historical data).
Credit Risk - System Level
2.47 The macro stress tests for credit risk suggest 
that under baseline scenario, GNPA ratio of all SCBs 
is expected to rise to around 3.8 per cent by September 
2013 from 3.4 per cent of March 2013, whereas, under 
the assumed improved macroeconomic condition for 
the fi nancial year (FY) 2013-14 (compared to 2012-13), 
GNPA ratio may decline subsequently to 3.5 per cent 
by March 2014. However, under severe stress scenario, 
GNPA ratio may rise to 4.4 per cent by March 2014 
(Chart 2.26). Under such severe risk scenario, the 
system level CRAR of SCBs could decline to 12.2 per 
cent by March 2014, but will still remain above the 
regulatory requirement of 9 per cent (Chart 2.27). This 
projection of GNPAs, however, does not capture the 
likely impact of the withdrawal of forbearance for 
restructured loans.
Credit Risk - Bank Group Level
2.48 Among the bank-groups, public sector banks 
are projected to register the highest GNPA ratio. Under 
baseline scenario, the GNPA of public sector banks 
and foreign banks may rise to 4.1 per cent and 3.2 per 
cent by March 2014 from 3.8 per cent and 3.0 per cent 
in March 2013, respectively. Whereas, GNPA ratio of 
both old private banks and new private banks may 
rise to 2.3 per cent by March 2014 from 1.9 per cent 
in March 2013 (Chart 2.28).
Table 2.6 Macroeconomic Scenario Assumptions (FY: 2013-14)26
(Per cent)
Baseline Medium Stress Severe Stress
GDP Growth 5.7 4.0 2.4
WPI Infl ation 5.5 7.7 9.8
Short-term Interest Rate 6.8 8.4 10.0
Exports to GDP Ratio 16.8 15.1 13.4
Gross Fiscal Defi cit 4.8 5.9 7.0
26   These stress scenarios are stringent and conservative assessments under hypothetical-severely adverse economic conditions and should not be 
interpreted as forecasts or expected outcomes.
Note: The projection of system level GNPA has been done using three 
different but complementary econometric models, viz., Multivariate 
regression, Vector Autoregressive (which takes into accounts feedback 
impact of credit quality to macro variables and interaction effects) and 
Quantile regression ( which can deals tail risk and takes into account 
non-linear impact of macroeconomic shocks).
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns and Staff Calculations
Chart 2.26: Projection of System Level GNPAs
Source: RBI Supervisory return and Staff Calculations
Chart 2.27: Projection of System Level CRAR
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2.49 CRAR of PSBs, which is the lowest at around 12 
per cent, may decline to 10.8 per cent by March 2014 
under severe stress scenario. Under such severe risk 
scenario, the CRAR of new private sector banks, old 
private banks and foreign banks may decline to 15.5 
per cent, 12.4 per cent and 14.6 per cent from 17.5 
per cent, 13.8 per cent and 17.0 per cent recorded as 
at end of March 2013 quarter, respectively. However, 
even under severe stress scenario, the CRAR of all the 
bank groups is seen to remain above the regulatory 
requirement of 9 per cent (Chart 2.28).
Credit Risk - Sector Level
2.50 Macro stress test of sectoral credit risk revealed 
that, among the selected seven sectors, Construction 
and Agriculture are expected to register the highest 
NPA ratios of around 4.7 to 4.8 per cent by March 2014, 
followed by Iron & Steel sector. The adverse 
macroeconomic shocks seem to have maximum 
impact on Iron & Steel and Construction followed by 
Engineering (Table 2.7).
Table 2.7 Projected Sectoral NPA 
(Per cent to gross advances)
Sector Mar-13 
(Actual)
Sep-13 Mar-14
Baseline Medium Risk Severe Risk Baseline Medium Risk Severe Risk
Agriculture 4.7 4.9 5.1 5.2 4.6 4.9 5.1
Construction 4.0 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 5.1 5.5
Cement 2.7 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.9 4.2 4.4
Infrastructure 1.5 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.5 2.7
Iron and Steel 4.0 4.2 4.4 4.6 4.0 4.8 5.5
Engineering 3.7 4.1 4.2 4.5 3.9 4.5 5.1
Automobiles 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.4
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns and Staff Calculations
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns and Staff Calculations
Chart 2.28: Projection of Bank-group wise GNPAs and CRAR
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Top Down Stress Tests - Bank Level
2.51 A number of single factor sensitivity stress tests 
(top-down) were carried out on SCBs (60 banks 
comprising 99 per cent of total banking sector assets) 
to assess their vulnerabilities and resilience under 
various scenarios. The resilience of the commercial 
banks in respect of credit, interest rate and liquidity 
risks were studied through top down sensitivity 
analysis by imparting extreme but plausible shocks. 
The results are based on March 2013 data27. The same 
set of shocks was used by 25 select SCBs (comprising 
about 75 per cent of total assets) to conduct bottom 
up stress tests. The results of the bottom up stress 
tests broadly refl ected those of the top down stress 
tests and reconfi rmed the resilience of the banking 
system to a wide range of shocks.
Credit Risk
2.52 The impact of different static shocks for banks 
as on March 2013 shows that the system level CRAR 
remained above the required minimum of 9 per cent. 
The capital losses at the system level could be about 
29 per cent in the case of severe stress condition 
(Shock 1). The stress test results, further showed that 
some banks would fail to maintain required CRAR 
under stress scenarios (Chart 2.29).
2.53 The stress tests on credit concentration risk of 
banks show that the impact under various stress 
scenarios is not signifi cant. The impact on CRAR under 
the assumed scenarios of default of top three 
individual borrowers and default of top group 
borrower would be 240 and 185 basis points 
respectively and the system should be able to 
withstand this default. However, at individual level, 
a few banks with high concentration might be 
seriously impacted under stressed conditions.
27   For details on stress tests, please refer to the Annex-2.
Note: Shock 1: NPAs increases by 100 per cent
          Shock 2: 30 percent of restructured advances turn into NPAs (Sub-Standard)
          Shock 3: 30 percent of restructured advances are written-off (Loss)
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns and Staff Calculations
Chart 2.29: Top Down Stress Tests - Credit Risk
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Interest Rate Risk
2.54 The interest rate risk for the trading book (direct 
impact) under various stress scenarios is manageable 
with reduction in CRAR by 1 percentage points at the 
system level, though a few small banks would be 
impacted adversely. The major impact is due to 
upward movement ( 2.5 percentage points) of yield 
curve, especially for the low maturity buckets because 
of their relatively large size. For the same stress 
scenario the capital position of the banking system 
gets impacted by about 2.6 percentage points for the 
banking book.
Liquidity Risk
2.55 To capture the impact on the liquidity risk, 
analysis has been done with fi ve defi nitions of liquid 
assets28. As per these defi nitions, the liquid assets 
comprise of Cash, CRR, Inter-bank-deposits and 
Investments. Different liquid asset ratios are arrived 
at using various definitions under the baseline 
scenario. The stress scenarios are constructed to test 
the ability of banks to meet a run on their deposits 
using only their liquid assets. It is assumed that (1) 
ten per cent total deposits would be withdrawn in 10 
days and (2) three per cent deposits would be 
withdrawn in each day for 5 days. Under the stress 
scenarios, there were indications of deterioration in 
the liquidity position of banks though SLR investments 
and CRR helped the banks to ward off the liquidity 
pressure.
Bottom Up Stress Tests
2.56 The results of the bottom up stress tests carried 
out by select banks also testified to the general 
resilience of the banks to different kinds of shocks. 
As in the case of top down stress tests, the impact of 
the stress tests was relatively more severe on some 
banks with their stressed CRAR position falling below 
the regulatory minimum (Chart 2.30).
28  Please refer defi nitions 1 to 5 given in the footnote of Chart 2.31.
Credit Risk: 
Gross Credit
Shock1 NPAs increase by 100 per cent
Shock2 30 percent of restructured assets 
become NPAs
Shock3 5 percentage points increase in NPAs 
in each top 5 sector / industry
Credit Risk: 
Concentration
Shock1 The top three individual borrowers 
default
Shock2 The top largest group defaults
Shock3 Top fi ve industries/ sectors defaults: 
the borrowers of top fi ve industries/ 
sectors default
Interest Rate Risk – 
Banking Book
Shock Parallel upward shift in INR yield 
curve by 2.5 percentage points
Interest Rate Risk – 
Trading Book
Shock Parallel upward shift in INR yield 
curve by 2.5 percentage points
Source: Select banks
Chart 2.30: Bottom-up Stress Tests – Credit & Market Risks
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2.57 The results of bottom up stress tests for 
liquidity risk show signifi cant impact of liquidity 
shocks on select banks. The results also refl ect that 
SLR investments, and CRR deposits to some extent, 
helped the banks to sustain against the liquidity 
pressure from sudden and unexpected withdrawal of 
deposits by depositors (Chart 2.31).
Derivatives Portfolio of Banks
2.58 The derivatives portfolio of banks in India grew 
sharply in the years leading up to the global fi nancial 
crisis. Though the portfolio size has shrunk since 
2008, it still remains large with the outstanding 
notional principal of the derivatives portfolio of banks 
constituting over 120 per cent of banks’ total assets 
as on March 31, 2013. However, the credit equivalent 
of derivate portfolio is about 8 per cent of the balance 
sheet assets. The foreign banks as a group account for 
about 80 per cent of the outstanding notional 
principal in the derivatives market, whereas their 
share in the balance sheet assets of the banking 
system is only 7 per cent. The size of outstanding 
notional principal and their credit equivalent for 
foreign banks is about 1200 and 80 per cent of total 
assets respectively (Chart 2.32 and 2.33).
Liquid Assets Defi nitions
1 Cash + Excess CRR + Inter Bank Deposits + SLR Invest-
ments
2 Cash + Excess CRR + Inter Bank Deposits maturing-within-
1-month + Investments maturing-within-1-month
3 Cash + Excess CRR + Inter Bank Deposits maturing-within-
1-month + Excess SLR Investments
4 Cash + CRR + Inter Bank Deposits maturing-within-
1-month + Investments maturing-within-1-month
5 Cash + CRR + Inter Bank Deposits maturing-within-
1-month + Excess SLR Investments
6 Cash + Excess CRR + Inter Bank Deposits + Excess SLR 
Investments + other investments which the bank consider 
liquid
Liquidity Shocks
Shock1 10 percent deposits withdrawal (cumulative) during 30 
days period
Shock2 3 percent deposits withdrawal (each day) within 5 days
Source: Select banks
Chart 2.31: Bottom-up Stress Tests – Liquidity Risk
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 2.32: Trend in Notional Principal of Total Derivatives
Per cent to Total Assets
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 2.33: Derivatives Portfolio of SCBs – March 2013
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2.59 Among the sample banks29, the majority of 
outstanding derivative transactions are interbank 
transactions. The interbank segment of the derivatives 
portfolio constituted about 85 per cent of the total 
outstanding derivatives as at March 2013 (Chart 2.34).
2.60 The credit equivalent of derivative portfolio of 
public and private sector banks were not very 
signifi cant. However, the credit equivalent for foreign 
banks were large (Chart 2.35).
2.61 The mark to market (MTM) value of the 
derivatives portfolio for the banks in the sample 
varied – with most banks registering positive net 
MTM with the exception of a few large negative Net 
MTM (Chart 2.36).
2.62 A series of stress tests (sensitivity analysis) on 
derivative portfolios were conducted with the 
reference date as March 31, 2013. The banks in the 
sample reported the results of four separate shocks 
on interest rates and foreign exchange rates. The 
shocks on the interest rates ranged from 1.0 
percentage points to 2.5 percentage points, while that 
for foreign exchange rates was kept at 20 per cent. 
The stress tests were carried out on individual shocks, 
on stand-alone basis. The results showed that the 
average net impacts of shocks on sample banks were 
not very high (Chart 2.37).
PSB: Public Sector Bank, PB: Private Sector Bank, FB: Foreign Bank
Source: Sample banks (Bottom-up stress tests on derivate portfolio)
Chart 2.34: Share of Inter-bank segment in derivatives transactions – 
March 2013
PSB: Public Sector Bank, PB: Private Sector Bank, FB: Foreign Bank
Source: Sample banks (Bottom-up stress tests on derivate portfolio)
Chart 2.35: Credit Equivalent of Derivatives Portfolio – March 2013 
(Per cent to Total Balance-sheet Assets)
PSB: Public Sector Bank, PB: Private Sector Bank, FB: Foreign Bank
Source: Sample banks (Bottom-up stress tests on derivate portfolio)
Chart 2.36: MTM of Total Derivatives
(Per cent to Total Assets)
Source: Sample banks (Bottom-up stress tests on derivate portfolio)
Chart 2.37: Stress Tests - Impact of shocks on Derivatives Portfolio of 
Select Banks (Change in net MTM on application of a shock)
(Per cent to capital funds)
29  Stress tests on derivatives portfolios were conducted for a sample of 22 select banks. Details are in Annex-2.
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Scheduled Urban Co-operative Banks (SUCBs)
2.63 The CRAR of SUCBs has remained at 12.7 per 
cent as at end March 2013, whereas, GNPA ratio 
declined to 5.3 per cent as at end March 2013 from 
6.1 per cent in September 2012. The annualised return 
on assets (RoA) declined from 1.1 per cent in the 
quarter ended September 2012 to 0.9 per cent in the 
quarter ended March 2013. The Liquidity Ratio for 
the SUCBs declined marginally to 34.0 per cent in 
March 2013 from 34.1 per cent in September 2012. 
However, the Provision Coverage Ratio (PCR) of SUCBs 
improved to 73.7 per cent in March 2013 from 66.3 
per cent in September 2012 (Table 2.8). 
2.64 Stress tests for assessment of credit risk were 
carried out for SUCBs using the data as on March 31, 
2013. The impact of credit risk shocks on the CRAR 
of the SUCBs was observed under two different 
scenarios assuming an increase in the gross NPA ratio 
by 50 per cent and 100 per cent respectively. The 
results show that SUCBs could withstand shocks 
assumed under the fi rst scenario easily, though they 
would come under some stress under the second 
scenario (Chart 2.38).
2.65 Stress tests on liquidity risk were carried out 
under two different scenarios assuming increase in 
cash outfl ows in the 1 to 28 days time bucket by 50 
per cent and 100 per cent respectively. It was further 
assumed that there was no change in cash infl ows 
under both the scenarios. The SUCBs would be 
impacted as a result of the stress if the mismatch or 
negative gap (i.e. the cash infl ow being less than the 
cash outfl ow) in the 1 to 28 days time bucket exceeds 
20 per cent of outfl ows. The stress test results indicate 
that the SUCBs would be signifi cantly impacted even 
under the less severe stress scenario (Chart 2.39).
Table 2.8 Select Financial Soundness Indicators of SUCBs
 (Per cent)
Financial Soundness Indicators Sep-12 Mar-13
1. CRAR 12.7 12.7
2. Gross NPAs to Gross Advances 6.1 5.3
3. Return on Assets (annualized) 1.1 0.9
4. Liquidity Ratio 34.1 34.0
5. Provision Coverage Ratio 66.3 73.7
Note: 1. Data are provisional and based on OSS Returns.
 2. Liquidity Ratio = 100 * (Cash + due from banks + SLR 
investment) / Total Assets.
 3. PCR = NPA provisions held as per cent of Gross NPAs.
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns and Staff Calculations
Note : An SUCB is considered impacted if its CRAR falls below 9 per cent
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns and Staff Calculations
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns and Staff Calculations
Chart 2.38: Impact of Shocks on Capital Position – SUCBs – March 2013
Chart 2.39: Impact of Liquidity Shocks – SUCBs – March 2013
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Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs)
2.66 The NBFCs sector under Reserve Bank‘s 
regulation is dominated by non-deposit taking 
systemically important NBFCs (NBFC-ND-SIs), which 
account for around 90 per cent of the sector in terms 
of asset size.
Capital Adequacy
2.67 The CRAR norms were made applicable to 
NBFCs-ND-SI w.e.f April, 200730, in terms of which 
every systemically important non-deposit taking 
NBFC is required to maintain a minimum capital, 
consisting of Tier-I and Tier- II capital, of not less than 
15 per cent of its aggregate risk-weighted assets. The 
aggregate CRAR of the NBFCs-ND-SI sector stood at 
26.8 per cent for the quarter ended December 2012 
(27.4 per cent in the previous quarter ended 
September 2012) (Chart 2.40).
Asset Quality
2.68 The GNPA ratio of the NBFCs-ND-SI sector stood 
at 3.2 per cent for the quarter ended December 2012 
as against 2.5 per cent for the same quarter in the 
preceding year. Trends in GNPA ratio is given in Chart 
2.41.
Profi tability
2.69 The ROAs (net profi t as a percentage of total 
assets) of the NBFCs-ND-SI sector stood at 2.1 per cent 
for the quarter ended December 2012 as compared 
with 1.8 per cent for the same quarter in the previous 
year (Chart 2.42).
Real Estate Exposure
2.70 Advances of NBFCs-ND-SI to real estate sector 
on an average accounted for 4.5 per cent of total 
advances to this sector. Trends in advances to real 
estate sector in absolute terms are furnished in 
Chart 2.43.
30  Vide Notifi cation No. DNBS.193 DG (VL) 2007, dated 22-02-2007
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 2.40: Trends in Capital to Risk Weighted Assets Ratio
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 2.41: Trends in Gross NPA Ratio
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 2.42: Trends in Return on Assets
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Capital Market Exposure (CME)
2.71 Capital  market exposure includes ( i ) 
investments in listed instruments and (ii) advances 
to capital market related activities. CME of the 
NBFCs-ND-SI sector on an average accounted for 8.8 
per cent of total assets of the sector, while CME to 
own funds of the sector accounted for 34.0 per cent 
(Chart 2.44).
Stress Tests - Credit Risk
System level (NBFC-D and NBFC-ND-SI)
2.72 Stress tests on credit risk for NBFCs (includes 
both deposit taking and ND-SI sectors) for the period 
ended December 2012 were carried out under two 
scenarios (i) where gross NPA increased two times and 
(ii) gross NPA increased 5 times from the current level. 
It was observed that in the first scenario, CRAR 
dropped by 1.1 percentage points from 21.7 per cent 
to 20.6 per cent while in the second scenario CRAR 
dropped by 4.4 percentage points (CRAR dropped from 
21.7 per cent to 17.3 per cent). It may be concluded 
that even though there will be a decline in CRAR under 
both the scenarios, it will remain above the minimum 
required level of 15 per cent.
Select NBFCs
2.73 Stress tests on credit risk for individual NBFCs 
for the period ended December 2012 was also carried 
out under the same scenarios as used for system level 
stress tests. Under the fi rst scenario, it was observed 
that CRAR in respect of 3.5 per cent companies was 
less than minimum regulatory requirement of 15 per 
cent while in the second scenario, CRAR in respect of 
8.9 per cent companies went under 15 per cent.
Insurance
Soundness
2.74 The soundness of insurance companies is 
indicated by solvency ratio. During the fi rst three 
quarters of the fi nancial year 2012-13, the life and 
non-life insurance companies comfortably maintained 
the minimum required solvency ratios of 1.5 and 1.3, 
respectively.
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 2.44: Trends in Exposure to Capital Market
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 2.43: Trends in Advances to Real Estate Sector
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Business operations
2.75 The total premium collected by life insurance 
companies during the fi rst three quarters of 2012-13 
was `1.80 trillion out of which LIC accounted 71.9 
per cent. During the same period, total premium 
collected by non life insurance companies (excluding 
GIC) was `513.88 billion, out of which 52.5 per cent 
was contributed by the four companies in the public 
sector.
Life Insurance
2.76 The business of the life insurance sector, 
measured in terms of new business premium 
continued to contract for the last two years. The new 
business premium contracted by 6.3 per cent on y-o-y 
basis in the FY: 2012-13 (Chart 2.45). This contraction 
was observed in both public (i.e. Life Insurance 
Corporation of India (LIC)) and private sectors. The 
profi tability of the life insurance companies had also 
declined during the fi rst three quarters of 2012-13 
from the previous year. A major shift in the sector has 
been the move away from ULIP products, which is 
especially evident in the private sector.
Single Premium Policies
2.77 A major part of the new business premium of 
LIC is from single premium policies, hovering around 
60 per cent of the total premium. Since 2010 -11, 
private insurers have also expanded their single 
premium business to about 30 per cent of the total. 
Overall contribution of single premium business for 
the life insurance sector increased to 51.4 per cent 
during 2012-13 from 45.2 per cent of the previous 
year (Chart 2.46).
2.78 From Chart 2.46, it can be observed that the 
number of single premium policies sold is declining 
with increase in premium indicating rising ticket size 
of single premium policies. 
Source: IRDA
Chart 2.45: New Business Premium
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Persistency
2.79 Life insurance policies being long term in 
nature, it is necessary to put in place measures to 
ensure that they remain in force throughout their life. 
Persistency31 of life policies is, however, a problem 
globally due to the following issues i) during the life 
of the policy, there might be better products with 
more benefi cial features available in the market, or 
ab initio the product was not appropriate to the 
insured’s requirements over the l ifetime; 
ii) extraneous factors like change in the policyholder’s 
economic profi le, job, etc., and iii) poor after- sales 
service due to attrition of agents, etc., IRDA has been 
initiating measures to improve the persistency in the 
Indian life insurance market, especially for post sales 
service of orphan policies. This has resulted in some 
improvement.
Pension Fund
2.80 The New Pension System (NPS) introduced by 
the Government of India with a view to develop the 
pension sector, is mandatory for all new recruits to 
the Government (except armed forces) with effect 
from January 1, 2004 and has also been rolled out to 
all citizens with effect from May 1, 2009 on a 
voluntary basis. During March 2010 and March 2013 
the subscriber base of NPS grew by 522.9 per cent, 
whereas, the corpus increased by 538.0 per cent, 
indicating a steep growth pattern in the subscriber 
base and corpus during the short time (Table 2.9).
31  Percentage of an insurance company’s already written policies remaining in force, without lapsing or being replaced by policies of other insurers.
Table 2.9: Developments in New Pension System
Number of Subscribers 
(in Lakhs)
Assets Under Management 
(in Crores)
Growth of Mar-13 
over Mar-10 (%)
Mar-10 Mar-11 Mar-12 Mar-13 Mar-10 Mar-11 Mar-12 Mar-13 No of 
Subcribers
AUM
Central Government 5.96 7.48 9.47 11.40 4,484.04 7,266.39 11,341.43 17,576.00 91.15 291.97
State Government 1.79 5.83 11.44 16.26 185.64 1,203.95 3,420.42 10,489.00 806.22 5,550.18
NPS Main-Private Sector 0.04 0.36 0.74 2.13 9.52 111.26 260.93 1,351.00 5,042.44 14,091.18
NPS Lite 4.86 9.69 18.79 - 3.13 140.46 436.00 - -
Total 7.80 18.53 31.34 48.58 4,679.20 8,584.73 15,163.24 29,852.00 522.85 537.97
- : Not Available.
Source: PFRDA  
Source: IRDA
Chart 2.46: Composition of New Business Premium- 
Single Premium vis-à-vis Non-Single Premium 
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2.81 The fast growing subscriber base and corpus 
have been accompanied with notable returns. The 
weighted average return as on March 31, 2013 
calculated on the basis of Net Asset Value of the NPS 
Schemes was in the range of 8.4 per cent to 14.2 per 
cent (Table 2.10).
2.82 The 2013-14 budget estimated a total outfl ow 
of ` 707.26 billion on pensions of central government 
employees alone, which is an increase of 10.79 per 
cent over the revised estimate of `638.36 billion for 
2012-13. The outfl ows are expected to rise as the 
cohort of recruits between 1970s and 1980s retire. In 
the case of several Defi ned Benefi t (DB) schemes, 
currently under implementation and newly announced 
(mostly in the government sector), the lack of liability 
computation especially in a world of rising life 
expectancy can be a potential source of fi scal stress 
in years when there are large payouts.
Table 2.10: Weighted Average Returns on Pension Funds
Scheme Returns (Per cent)
Central Government 12.39
State Government 13.00
Swavalamban 13.40
Private: Equity 8.38
Private: Corporate Debt 14.19
Private: Government Debt 13.52
Source: PFRDA
 Chapter III Financial Sector Regulation and Infrastructure
46
Chapter III
Financial Sector Regulation and Infrastructure
The progress in the implementation of various reforms in different countries is likely to be guided as much by legacy 
issues as by a mix of factors such as the stage of financial sector development on the one hand and relative significance 
and priorities of various reforms for the respective economic systems on the other. In the interim, there is a risk that 
emerging inconsistencies in regulatory approach in some of the major jurisdictions may create hurdles to the smooth 
functioning of international financial markets and institutions. In any case, regulatory dialectics are expected to 
continue as new regulatory gaps emerge.
India has made steady progress in implementation of the G20/ Financial Stability Board (FSB) led global reforms, 
in various areas viz. Basel – III, OTC derivatives, regulation of systemically important financial institutions, 
shadow banking sector etc. While staying committed to the reforms agenda, India is conscious of the pitfalls of the 
‘one size fits all’ approach to regulation. Furthermore, it is important to take cognizance of the historical evolution 
and unique characterisitics of the financial system, while reviewing the legal-regulatory framework for the Indian 
financial sector.
The recent episodes of some unhealthy practices in the shadow banking sector have underlined the importance of 
extending the regulatory perimeter and strengthening the supervisory functions. That brings forth the need for 
enhancing the effectiveness of coordination mechanism with law enforcement agencies to ensure a higher degree of 
consumer protection in financial sector.
At a time when efforts are on to augment the household financial savings, it is important to enhance the credibility 
of the financial system by addressing the risks posed by mis-selling of financial products, perverse incentive practices, 
risks from the technology issues such as erroneous trades, high frequency trading, card / electronic payment 
transactions etc.
Implementation of Global Regulatory Reforms
Regulatory Dialectics
3.1 Implementation of agreed global reforms is 
underway in various jurisdictions even as  there is a 
parallel process of rethinking on the architecture of 
fi nancial regulation. Excessive deregulation and soft 
touch regulations were among the main factors that 
contributed to the fi nancial crisis which the reforms 
intended to address. However, as memories of the 
crisis are fading, questions are being raised over the 
proposed measures for reregulation. The rethinking 
on the reforms veers around the relative benefi ts of 
increased capital levels (especially of ‘too big to fail’ 
entities) versus the development of the fi nancial 
markets and the costs of banking business. While the 
regulatory dialectics will continue, regulators may 
fi nd it diffi cult to steer their reforms through such 
trade-offs (Box 3.1).
Signs of Home-bias in Regulation
3.2 While considerable progress has been achieved 
in building global consensus on reforms, regulatory 
chauvinism has been raising its head in certain 
jurisdictions. The divergent approaches to additional 
regulatory measures in many advanced jurisdictions 
might lead to slowdown in fi nancial globalisation. For 
example, the main proposals under the Volker rules 
in the US, Vickers report in the UK and Liikanen report 
in the EU, are essentially based on ring-fencing 
models. However, there are some important 
differences in terms of the range of activities that can 
be undertaken by and between the ring-fenced 
entities. While the relative merits and de-merits of a 
home-bias to regulation might be diffi cult to gauge at 
this juncture, there are some immediate possible 
effects of such regulations, such as the Volcker Rule 
prescriptions affecting the operations of the US banks 
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in India as they are major players in domestic foreign 
exchange, government securities and interest rate 
swap markets.
Indian Approach to Implementation of Reforms
3.3 Domestic factors and policy priorities have 
continued to guide the Indian approach to fi nancial 
sector regulation, while adhering to the commitment 
to implement the agreed global reforms and 
international standards. The Financial Stability and 
Development Council (FSDC), through its Sub 
Committee is coordinating and monitoring the 
implementation of various reforms, starting with an 
assessment of extant regulatory framework in the 
country vis-à-vis the proposed reforms. The reforms 
directly related to and contained within the regulatory 
purview of the individual sectoral regulators are being 
handled independently by them; reform areas which 
need active inter-regulatory/inter agency coordination 
are being spearheaded by the inter-agency 
implementation groups focussing on specifi c areas, 
viz. resolution regime, shadow banking, fi nancial 
market infrastructure, legal entity identifi er, and 
credit rating agencies. A roadmap indicating the 
timelines for implementation of these reforms is 
proposed to be set out by the respective groups.
Basel – III
Effect of Risk Weight Based Approach
3.4 Basel III aims to address the shortcomings in 
the Basel-II framework, which surfaced during the 
global fi nancial crisis. One of the main factors for the 
crisis was the build-up of excessive leverage while 
maintaining the risk based capital ratio above the 
regulatory requirement, as some of the banks’ internal 
models facilitated mathematical maneuvering of risk 
weights. The inherent complexity and opacity 
involved in the modelling exercise, notwithstanding 
 Regulated players move faster than the regulators
 International regulatory bodies move more slowly 
and less freely than all other players
In a recent paper1 Kane opined that “In the US, strategies 
for dealing with regulation-induced innovation and for 
disciplining the institutions that recklessly spawned 
these plagues have been assigned to teams of incentive 
confl icted and understaffed regulators to work out” 
and that “Bankers understand the fi nancial safety net 
as a politically enforceable implicit contract that they 
have negotiated with their national governments” and 
“not as something external to their balance sheets”. He 
further feels that “lobbyists create a taxpayer put by 
creating an excessive fear in the minds of regulators of 
letting banks’ accounting decisions or health be called 
into question”2
Box 3.1: Regulation, Innovation and Regulatory Dialectics
1  Kane, E (2012) “Bankers and Brokers First: Loose Ends in the Theory of Central-Bank Policymaking”, accessed from https://www2.bc.edu/edward-kane/
Bankers%20and%20Brokers%20First.pdf
2  Kane, E (2011), “Loose Ends in Capital Regulation: Facing Up to the Regulatory Dialectic”, presentation at International Banking Conference Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago, November 11, 2011, Chicago
More than three decades ago Edward J. Kane put forth 
the idea of a dynamic model depicting the interaction 
between the regulated and the regulators and called 
it “regulatory dialectics”. Under this model, fi nancial 
market regulation is an endless process with both 
the regulator and the regulated making alternative 
moves. Interestingly, way back in the eighties Kane has 
suggested the following order in which the fi nancial 
market players in the dialectics model exhibit their 
average adaptive effi ciencies, and concluded that the lag 
between regulation and avoidance is shorter than the lag 
between avoidance and regulation.
 Less regulated players move faster and more freely 
than the more regulated ones
 Private players move faster and more freely than 
governmental ones
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the scrutiny and supervisory validation process, 
allowed the banks to indulge in aggressive application 
of risk weights, driven mainly by their business 
considerations.
3.5 A recent paper3 has found that the risk-weight 
density defi ned as ratio of risk-weighted assets (RWAs) 
to total assets, of banks is observed to be lower once 
regulatory approval is granted for the internal ratings-
based (IRB) approaches of Basel II. It is further noted 
that the effect persists for different loan categories, 
which cannot be explained by fl awed modelling or 
improved risk-measurement alone. These observations 
have resulted in the additional regulatory prescriptions 
under Basel III, wherein common equity requirements 
have not only been more than doubled but also are 
required to be topped up with capital conservation 
buffer4.
Marginal Increase in RWAs for Indian Banks
3.6 The scatter diagrams of ratio of RWA to total 
assets5 of Indian banks show that the average value 
of the ratio has increased from 60 per cent as at 
end March 2012 to 62 per cent as at end March 2013 
(Chart 3.1). The dispersion in ratio values has also 
decreased marginally between these two dates. The 
trends and outliers need to be monitored as more and 
more banks adopt the internal model based approaches 
under Basel II and Basel III6.
Leverage Ratio – ‘Back to Basics’
3.7 In order to arrest the tendency to build up 
excessive leverage, a simple non-risk based leverage 
ratio has been prescribed under Basel II, which will 
act as a complementary ‘backstop’ measure to the 
risk-based capital requirements. The leverage ratio 
can be easily understood by all the stakeholders of a 
3  Maristhasan, M and O, Merrouche (2013), “The Manipulation of Basel Risk-Weights”, CEPR Discussion Paper -9494, CEPR
4 Additional capital in the form of a buffer, equivalent to 2.5 per cent of the risk weighted assets, to be drawn down in periods of stress
5 On-balance sheet assets as well as off-balance sheet assets have been used for calculation.
6 Section 2.29 of Chapter II of this Report may also be seen.
Chart 3.1: RWA Density
Source: RBI Supervisory returns and staff calculations
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bank, viz., shareholders, creditors, depositors and 
regulators and facilitates easier assessment of the 
capital adequacy of the institution. The Basel 
Committee is testing the Tier I leverage ratio during 
the parallel run period from January 1, 2013 to January 
1, 2017.
Revised Basel III Guidelines on Short Term Liquidity
3.8 In January 2013, the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) issued the revised 
guidelines7 on Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)8 after 
incorporating a number of changes in the original 
version published in December 2010 (Box 3.2). The 
changes were necessitated to minimise the potential 
impact of the LCR standard on the fi nancial markets, 
extension of credit and economic growth. Also, the 
BCBS has considered a broader timeframe for the 
introduction of the LCR standard, in view of the 
signifi cant fi nancial strains persisting in some banking 
systems.
Reserve Bank’s Guidelines on Liquidity Norms
3.9 The Reserve Bank indicated in the guidelines 
on liquidity risk management issued in November 
2012, that the fi nal guidelines on Basel III liquidity 
standards will be issued once the Basel Committee 
fi nalises the relevant framework. The Basel Committee 
has since issued the guidelines (Basel III: The Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio and Liquidity Risk Monitoring Tools) 
in January 2013 and is in the process of fi nalising the 
LCR disclosure requirements and the Net Stable 
Funding Ratio (NSFR)9. The Reserve Bank will issue 
the fi nal guidelines on Basel III liquidity standards 
and liquidity risk monitoring tools, taking into 
account the revisions by the Basel Committee. While 
the enhanced liquidity risk management measures 
are expected to be implemented by banks immediately, 
the Basel III liquidity standards, viz., LCR and NSFR, 
will be binding on banks from January 1, 2015 and 
January 1, 2018, respectively.
Expansion of the range of eligible assets as part of 
high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) - through the addition 
of a new category of Level 2B assets which national 
supervisors may choose to recognise as HQLA in their 
local LCR regulations.
Recalibration of the stress assumptions for some 
cash-fl ow items (including in respect of retail and non-
fi nancial corporate deposits and undrawn committed 
facilities), taking into account industry feedback and 
actual experience in times of stress.
Affi rmation of the usability of the stock of HQLA by 
banks in times of stress, allowing the LCR to fall below 
the minimum requirement. Supervisors will need to 
establish guidance to specify the circumstances for usage 
of the HQLA, and to ensure appropriate supervisory 
action in response to such circumstances; and
Adoption of a phase-in arrangement that introduces 
the LCR as planned on January 1, 2015, but with the 
minimum requirement set at 60 per cent. This will then 
rise by 10 percentage points per annum to reach 100 per 
cent on January 1, 2019. This graduated approach is to 
ensure that the standard can be implemented without 
material disruption to the ongoing strengthening of 
banking systems and fi nancing of economic activity.
Box 3.2: Major Changes Announced in the LCR Guidelines
7  Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools, January 2013, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.pdf
8   The LCR, expressed as a ratio of “Stock of high-quality liquid assets” to “Total net cash outfl ows over the next 30 calendar days”, is one of the two 
global liquidity standards which form an essential component of the Basel III guidelines. The objective of LCR is to ensure the short-term resilience of 
banks through an adequate stock of unencumbered high-quality liquid assets to meet contingent liquidity needs for 30 calendar days under an acute 
liquidity stress scenario.
9   The NSFR standard is structured to ensure that long term assets are funded with at least a minimum amount of stable liabilities in relation to their 
liquidity risk profi les.
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More Stringent Capital Requirements and Timelines
3.10 The Reserve Bank of India has already 
introduced Basel III capital regulations, effective April 
1, 2013, to be implemented in a phased manner over 
a period of time ending March 31, 2018. Thus India’s 
schedule for full implementation is nine months 
ahead of Basel committee’s deadline. As a matter of 
prudence and also to preempt the possibility of the 
judgemental errors in computing capital adequacy, 
the Reserve Bank has prescribed a higher minimum 
Tier I capital, which is one full percentage point above 
the Basel III requirements (Table 3.1). Pending 
fi nalisation of leverage ratio by the BCBS, the Reserve 
Bank has introduced a minimum Tier I leverage ratio 
of 4.5 per cent (Tier I capital to total assets ratio), 
which will be reviewed later based on the final 
recommendations by the BCBS.
Additional Capital Requirements
3.11 Analytical studies10 have indicated the likely 
adverse impact on lending (and growth) due to the 
higher capital requirements for banks, at the global 
level. However, the burden from the increase in cost 
of lending is expected to be offset by the benefi ts 
accruing from a more robust banking system. The 
improved capital ratios of banks are expected to instill 
more trust among the stakeholders, thereby reducing 
their cost of capital over a period of time.
3.12 It is expected that the long timeframe to phase 
in Basel III capital requirements will allow Indian 
banks to make a smooth and non-disruptive transition. 
Initial estimates indicate that the additional capital 
requirements of Indian banks would be to the order 
of `5 trillion, of which non-equity capital will be to 
the tune of `3.25 trillion with the rest to come from 
equity.11
Table 3.1: Capital requirements for Indian banks under Basel III 
(as percent of RWAs)
Basel III 
standards
RBI 
prescriptions
Minimum common equity (MCE) 4.5 5.5
Capital conservation buffer (CCB) 2.5 2.5
Total (MCE+CCB) 7.0 8.0
Minimum Tier I Capital 6.0 7.0
Minimum Tier I Capital + CCB 8.5 9.5
Minimum Total Capital 8.0 9.0
Minimum Total Capital + CCB 10.5 11.5
10  Macroeconomic Assessment Group (2010), “Assessing the Macroeconomic Impact of the Transition to Stronger Capital and Liquidity Requirements”, 
Final Report of the Group established by the Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Bank of International Settlements.
11  Subbarao, D (2013), “The Global Financial Crisis and the Indian Financial Sector What Have We Learnt and How Have We Responded?”, Address at the 
7th International Banking & Finance Conference 2013 organised by the Indian Merchants’ Chamber, Mumbai, June 5, 2013
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Foreign Banks’ Presence in India - Subsidiary 
Structure
3.13 Traditionally Indian approach to financial 
regulation has been on combining global experience 
and local circumstances. As regards the global mega 
banking institutions, ‘too complex to regulate’ had 
been a concern for Indian regulators in respect of 
their Indian operations. The road map laid down by 
the Reserve Bank in 2005 allowed foreign banks the 
choice of entering India either as a branch or a 
subsidiary. Refl ecting the post crisis shift in global 
policy thinking, the current stance of the Reserve 
Bank is in favour of subsidiarisation model. While 
some tax related issues such as exemption from 
stamp duty and capital gains tax-subsequent to the 
conversion of branches into subsidiaries, have been 
addressed; certain legal issues are still being 
resolved.
Operational Risk under Advanced Measurement 
Approach
3.14 The previous FSR had raised concerns about 
the diffi culties in measuring operational risks and 
limitations of the standardised approaches. The 
Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA) for 
computing capital charge for operational risks is the 
most risk-sensitive and sophisticated among the three 
approaches prescribed under the Basel II.
3.15 The Reserve Bank had issued guidelines on 
AMA in April 2011 and Indian banks could apply for 
migration to AMA with effect from April 1, 2012. Four 
banks have, since, approached the Reserve Bank for 
permission for migration to AMA. Some major 
challenges being faced by banks in implementation 
of AMA approaches relate to issues of internal 
governance, diffi culties in determining the relevant 
business environment and internal control factors 
(BEICFs), constraints on availability of historical loss 
data, including both internal and external data, 
scenario data, and modeling and quantifi cation of 
operational loss data. Regulatory permissions for use 
of AMA for operational risk capital computation would 
be considered based on the assessment of the 
preparedness of banks in this regard.
Over The Counter Derivatives
3.16 The thrust of the post crisis reforms on Over 
The Counter  (OTC) derivatives is towards 
standardisation of products, central counter party 
(CCP) based electronic trading platform and reporting 
of trades through trade repositories (TRs). Opacity of 
products, excessive bilateral exposures coupled with 
insuffi cient collateral and the interconnectedness 
amongst market participants are the main risks in the 
OTC derivatives markets, globally. FSB is currently 
monitoring the progress of implementation of these 
reforms within the G20 nations.
Status of Implementation in India
3.17 In India, the small size of the OTC derivatives 
market, low level of complexity in products, orderly 
development and regulation of market have ensured 
that there are no major concerns with regard to 
systemic risks from OTC markets. The OTC 
derivative products were introduced in a phased 
manner keeping in view the hedging needs of the 
real sector. The current regulations mandate that 
validity of any OTC derivative contract is contingent 
on one of the parties to the transaction being a 
regulated entity. The Clearing Corporation of India 
Limited (CCIL) provides the clearing and settlement 
of transactions in government securities, money 
market instruments and foreign exchange products. 
Reserve Bank, as the regulator of the OTC derivative 
markets, has focussed on improving transparency 
and reducing counterparty risk in the OTC derivatives 
markets and has fostered development of robust 
market infrastructure for trading, settlement and 
reporting of transactions. As India is committed to 
implementation of the G20 / FSB reforms, reasonable 
progress has been made in implementing the OTC 
derivative reform measures.
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Standardisation of Products
3.18 The process of standardisation of OTC 
derivative products is planned to be undertaken 
gradually. Credit Default Swaps (CDS) transactions 
are standardised in terms of documentation, coupon, 
coupon payment date etc. The standardisation of 
Interest Rate Swap (IRS) contracts is aimed to be 
achieved in terms of minimum notional principal 
amount, tenors, trading hours, settlement calculations 
etc., in consultation with the market participants. As 
the first step, standardisation has been made 
mandatory for INR Mumbai Inter Bank Offer Rate 
(MIBOR)-Overnight Index Swap (OIS) contracts, from 
April 1, 2013. Other benchmarks in IRS are proposed 
to be standardised in subsequent phases. Foreign 
exchange derivatives are ‘plain vanilla’ and structures 
go by market convention.
Centralised Clearing of Foreign Exchange and 
Interest Rate Forward Trades
3.19 There is a guaranteed centralised clearing 
arrangement for settlement of USD-INR forward 
transactions. Mandatory central clearing of foreign 
exchange forwards is proposed to be introduced 
shortly. The IRS and Forward Rate Agreements (FRA) 
in the Indian rupee, which form the bulk of interest 
rate derivative transactions in the market, are 
currently being centrally cleared in a non-guaranteed 
mode. Although it is not mandatory for market 
participants to clear their trades through CCP, more 
than 97 per cent of fund fl ows in IRS/FRA are being 
settled through CCIL. The CDS market in India is still 
developing and it may take more time to achieve the 
necessary market activity to support central clearing 
of CDS transactions. The risk management framework 
and procedural aspects proposed by the CCP and the 
issues relating to exposure norms for derivative 
transactions are being examined.
3.20 Electronic platforms are available for 
transactions involving repos in government securities, 
IRS, FRA and foreign exchange forwards. The report12 
of a Working Group set up by the Reserve Bank has 
recommended, among other things, introduction of 
an electronic swap execution facility for the IRS 
market under a CCP, which may provide guaranteed 
settlement of trades executed through the electronic 
platform. The modalities involved in introducing 
these features are presently under examination.
3.21 As per existing regulatory guidelines, banks and 
primary dealers report IRS/FRA and foreign exchange 
derivative transactions on CCIL reporting platform. 
All CDS trades (including client trades), by market 
makers are required to be reported on CCIL’s reporting 
platform. Reporting of all major OTC foreign exchange 
derivatives to the TR has commenced since July 2012. 
Also, the reporting of client trades in foreign exchange 
derivatives, under suitable confi dentiality protocols, 
has commenced from April 2013. Presently, client 
trades in IRS are being reported by banks to the 
Reserve Bank and steps are being taken to institute 
the reporting framework for the client trades in 
respect of interest rate derivatives.
Risks from Extra Territorial Regulatory Jurisdiction 
of Regulation
3.22 The US and European laws dealing with OTC 
derivatives reform have raised concerns over 
possibilities of extra territorial regulatory jurisdiction 
leading to regulatory clashes and disruptions for 
market activity. For instance, European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) and the Commodity 
Exchange Act (CEA)-as modifi ed by the Dodd-Frank 
Act, contain prescriptive rules that may prevent 
European/US banks from participating in third-country 
clearing houses that have not applied for recognition 
by the European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA) or that are not registered as a derivatives 
clearing organisation (DCO) as per Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC) regulations. While the 
discussions are still on, the uncertainty over the 
inconsistencies between EU and US rules, the process 
and timeline for equivalence assessments may affect 
the functioning of international fi nancial markets and 
12  Working Group on Enhancing Liquidity in Government Securities and Interest Rate Derivatives Markets
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may have an impact on progress of implementation 
of G20 reform agenda.
Margins for Non-Centrally Cleared OTC Derivatives
3.23 The international standards on margining for 
non-centrally cleared OTC derivatives are in the 
process of being fi nalised. A Working Group set up by 
the BCBS and International Organisation of Securities 
Commission (IOSCO) to develop consistent global 
standards for margin requirements has submitted its 
draft report for consultation. One of the key principles 
being proposed for all covered entities (i.e. fi nancial 
firms and systemically-important non-financial 
entities) that engage in non-centrally-cleared 
derivatives is that they must exchange initial and 
variation margin as appropriate to the counterparty 
risks posed by such transactions. However, the actual 
quantum of the margin threshold may have to be left 
to national discretion to suit the domestic fi nancial 
markets.
Demand for Collateral
3.24 The improved standards  for  marg in 
requirements and the shift towards central clearing 
of standardised OTC derivatives contracts may 
contribute to a structural increase in the demand for 
collateral assets. At present there is no evidence or 
expectation of widespread scarcity of safe assets in 
global fi nancial markets. However, the temporary 
supply-demand imbalances and associated price 
changes are expected to generate powerful incentives 
for endogenous private sector responses such as 
broader eligibility criteria for collateral assets in 
private transactions, increased collateral re-use, 
collateral transformation etc. While such responses 
may help mitigate any shortage of collateral assets, 
they could also result in increase in interconnectedness, 
pro-cyclicality and fi nancial system opacity as well as 
higher operational, funding and rollover risks. These 
risks can be addressed by measures such as increased 
transparency through market disclosure and better 
regulatory reporting, stress-testing, risk-adjusted 
deposit insurance, prudential limits on asset 
encumbrance etc.
3.25 Asset encumbrance is very low in Indian 
banking system due to the fact that the funding of 
commercial banks in India is largely from unsecured 
and stable public deposits. Banks are required to 
maintain a portion of their assets in liquid 
unencumbered assets including sovereign securities 
to comply with the Statutory Liquidity Ratio13 (SLR). 
A relatively lower use of securitisation also limits the 
extent of encumbrance.
Legal Entity Identifi er System
3.26 The global fi nancial crisis, among other things, 
underscored the need for establishing a uniform 
global system for legal entity identifi cation to support 
aggregation of risk positions and fi nancial data. FSB 
took up the project on a global Legal Entity Identifi er 
(LEI) system to provide support to the objectives of 
effi cient assessment of micro-prudential and macro-
prudential risks. LEI is a form of legal entity 
aggregation that allows authorities to view and 
analyse the potential systemic risk arising from OTC 
derivatives transactions or positions, in one or more 
products, attributable to a group of legal entities 
sharing common affi liation. The data attributed to 
such an LEI group can assist authorities in assessing 
concentration and contagion risk associated with a 
group and its counterparties. The LEI system is 
expected to help facilitation of orderly resolution, 
containing market abuse and curbing fi nancial fraud, 
and enabling higher quality and accuracy of fi nancial 
data overall.
3.27 In January 2013, the global LEI system was 
formally launched with the establishment of the 
Regulatory Oversight Committee (ROC). The Reserve 
Bank has joined the ROC of the global LEI system and 
has set up a Steering Committee, to carry out a 
detailed study of the requirements of the project for 
13  Banks in India are required to maintain, at the close of business every day, a prescribed minimum SLR, the ratio of liquid assets (in the form of cash, 
gold and un-encumbered approved securities) to the Net Demand and Time Liabilities. 
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India. Apart from the OTC derivatives markets, the 
LEI system may also help in achieving a more robust 
credit information system in India.
Systemically Important Financial Institutions
3.28 Regulation and supervision of large and 
diversified financial institutions referred to as 
Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) 
have assumed signifi cance considering the system 
wide damage that their failure could potentially cause. 
India does not, at present, have any Globally 
Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) fi guring in the 
list of 28 G-SIBs14. However, there are banks and other 
types of fi nancial intermediaries which may not be 
signifi cant from an international perspective, but 
could still have an important impact on India’s 
domestic fi nancial system and economy, as compared 
to non-systemic institutions.
3.29 Recognising the importance of such entities, 
the FSB and the standard setting bodies are extending 
the SIFI framework to other systemically important 
fi nancial institutions, in respective areas. For the 
banking system, the FSB and BCBS have fi nalised a 
principles-based, minimum framework for addressing 
domestic systemically important banks (D-SIBs) 
(Box 3.3). According to FSB’s proposed timelines, the 
national authorities should begin to apply 
requirements to banks identifi ed as D-SIBs in line 
with the phase-in arrangements for the G-SIB 
framework, i.e. from January 2016. 
Consolidated Supervision of Financial Conglomerates 
in India
3.30 In India such big fi nancial groups are identifi ed 
as Financial Conglomerates (FCs), on the basis of their 
signifi cant presence in two or more market segments 
(Banking, Insurance, Securities, Non-Banking Finance 
and Pension). In an important step towards a more 
effective consolidated supervision of the FCs, the four 
fi nancial sector regulators in India, viz. Reserve Bank 
of India (RBI), Securities and Exchange Board of India 
(SEBI), Insurance Regulatory and Development 
Authority (IRDA) and Pension Fund Regulatory and 
Development Authority (PFRDA), have signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for co-
operation in the fi eld of consolidated supervision and 
monitoring of FCs.
3.31 An Inter-Regulatory Forum (IRF) has been 
constituted by the Sub Committee of the FSDC to 
strengthen the monitoring of FCs. The IRF is 
structured as a college of domestic supervisors by 
adopting the lead/principal regulator model, with a 
mandate to carry out two major functions viz. 
developing supervisory cooperation for effective 
consolidated supervision of FCs and assessing the 
risk to systemic stability due to activities of the FCs. 
The IRF, on a special case basis, may identify one or 
more ‘systemically important fi nancial groups’ having 
‘significant/dominant’ presence in one financial 
market segment and a ‘major/substantial’ presence 
in one more market segment for the purpose of 
inclusion in the FC Monitoring framework. The 
respective regulators are in the process of devising 
the criteria for entities under their jurisdictions, 
considering various indicators.
Cross Border Co-operation in Supervision 
3.32 The arrangements for sharing of information 
for improved cross border banking supervision and 
cooperation, in respect of internationally active banks, 
are being formalised through the signing of bilateral 
Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) by the Reserve 
bank with overseas supervisory counterparts (as 
“Home” and “Host” supervisors). This channel 
assumes greater importance as the cross border 
operations of Indian banks are expanding. The MoU 
provides a formal, yet legally non-binding gateway of 
information between the supervisors on the health 
of the supervised entities, coordination during on-site 
examinations and times of crises, while preserving 
the confi dentiality of information shared. The MoU 
does not override the laws of the land of either 
supervisor but only tries to build an environment of 
supervisory cooperation and coordination in complete 
adherence to such laws. Reserve Bank has executed 
such MoU with 16 overseas supervisors and proposals 
14 Annex 1 to FSB’s Update of group of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) November 2012
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The principles proposed for D-SIBs15 focus on the higher 
loss absorbency (HLA) requirement for D-SIBs.
The 12 principles for D-SIB framework are set out below:
Assessment methodology
Principle 1: National authorities should establish a 
methodology for assessing the degree to which banks are 
systemically important in a domestic context.
Principle 2: The assessment methodology for a D-SIB 
should refl ect the potential impact of, or externality 
imposed by, a bank’s failure.
Principle 3: The reference system for assessing the impact 
of failure of a D-SIB should be the domestic economy.
Principle 4: Home authorities should assess banks for 
their degree of systemic importance at the consolidated 
group level, while host authorities should assess 
subsidiaries in their jurisdictions, consolidated to include 
any of their own downstream subsidiaries, for their degree 
of systemic importance.
Principle 5: The impact of a D-SIB’s failure on the domestic 
economy should, in principle, be assessed having regard 
to bank-specifi c factors: (a) Size; (b) Interconnectedness; 
(c) Substitutability/fi nancial institution infrastructure 
(including considerations related to the concentrated 
nature of the banking sector); and (d) Complexity 
(including the additional complexities from cross-border 
activity). In addition, national authorities can consider 
other measures/data that would inform these bank-
specifi c indicators within each of the above factors, such 
as size of the domestic economy.
Principle 6: National authorities should undertake regular 
assessments of the systemic importance of the banks 
in their jurisdictions to ensure that their assessment 
refl ects the current state of the relevant fi nancial systems 
and that the interval between D-SIB assessments not be 
signifi cantly longer than the G-SIB assessment frequency.
Principle 7: National authorities should publicly disclose 
information that provides an outline of the methodology 
employed to assess the systemic importance of banks in 
their domestic economy.
Higher loss absorbency
Principle 8: National authorities should document the 
methodologies and considerations used to calibrate the 
level of HLA that the framework would require for D-SIBs 
in their jurisdiction. The level of HLA calibrated for D-SIBs 
should be informed by quantitative methodologies (where 
available) and country-specifi c factors without prejudice 
to the use of supervisory judgment.
Principle 9: The HLA requirement imposed on a bank 
should be commensurate with the degree of systemic 
importance, as identifi ed under Principle 5. In the case 
where there are multiple D-SIB buckets in a jurisdiction, 
this could imply differentiated levels of HLA between 
D-SIB buckets.
Principle 10: National authorities should ensure that 
the application of the G-SIB and D-SIB frameworks is 
compatible within their jurisdictions. Home authorities 
should impose HLA framework for dealing with D-SIBs 
requirements that they c alibrate at the parent and/
or consolidated level, and host authorities should 
impose HLA requirements that they calibrate at the 
sub-consolidated/subsidiary level. The home authority 
should test that the parent bank is adequately capitalised 
on a standalone basis, including cases in which a D-SIB 
HLA requirement is applied at the subsidiary level. 
Home authorities should impose the higher of either 
the D-SIB or G-SIB HLA requirements in the case where 
the banking group has been identifi ed as a D-SIB in the 
home jurisdiction as well as a G-SIB.
Principle 11: In cases where the subsidiary of a bank is 
considered to be a D-SIB by a host authority, home and 
host authorities should make arrangements to coordinate 
and cooperate on the appropriate HLA requirement, 
within the constraints imposed by relevant laws in the 
host jurisdiction.
Principle 12: The HLA requirement should be met 
fully by Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1). In addition, 
national authorities should put in place any additional 
requirements and other policy measures they consider 
to be appropriate to address the risks posed by a D-SIB.
Box 3.3: Extension of SIFI framework to D-SIBs
15   A framework for dealing with domestic systemically important banks by BCBS – October 2012
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non-bank sector [such as the Non-Banking Finance 
Companies (NBFCs) under the regulation of the 
Reserve Bank] are regulated in India, although less 
tightly than the banking system. However, a large part 
of the non-bank sector exists in the form of 
unincorporated entities which may be considered as 
part of shadow banking system, going by the spirit of 
FSB defi nition. In the light of their useful economic 
function, especially in countries like India where 
fi nancial inclusion is a national priority, there is need 
for a different approach to regulation of such non-
bank entities, while pursuing the objective of 
consumer protection alongside that of financial 
stability. 
Deposit Taking and Other Systemically Important 
NBFCs
3.37 The regulatory focus of RBI has primarily been 
on protection of depositors’ interest, and hence on 
deposit taking NBFCs (referred as NBFC-D). The 
regulatory measures over time, especially since 1997-
98 have resulted in consolidation of the NBFC sector 
refl ecting in a reduction in the number of deposit 
taking NBFCs. The quantum of the public deposits of 
NBFCs absolute terms as well as in terms of proportion 
of the bank deposits has also decreased substantially 
(Chart 3.2). As many NBFCs stopped their deposit 
taking activities, the scale of operations of non-deposit 
in respect of 28 other overseas supervisors are under 
discussion.
3.33 There is a need for supervisory emphasis on 
domestically signifi cant institutions, including banks, 
especially those having substantial cross-border 
operations. Supervisory Colleges have been established 
for two big Indian banks, as part of the efforts to 
increase the supervisory intensity for such institutions. 
Resolution Regime
3.34 The previous FSRs have mentioned about the 
absence of comprehensive/separate legal-institutional 
arrangement for resolution of different types of 
financial sector entities in India. Currently, the 
resolution of banks is facilitated under the Banking 
Regulation (BR) Act, 1949 which has provisions for 
compulsory or voluntary mergers. The work on 
implementation of reforms on resolution regime has 
started with an examination of existing legislative 
arrangements for resolution of various types of 
fi nancial sector entities (including commercial banks, 
cooperative banks, insurance companies etc.). A 
Working Group was set up under the direction of the 
FSDC Sub Committee on a comprehensive resolution 
regime for all types of fi nancial institutions in India.
Shadow Banking
3.35 Shadow banking entities played a signifi cant 
role during the global fi nancial crisis, due to their 
interconnectedness with the rest of the fi nancial 
system. It is, therefore, imperative to identify and 
manage any risks that the shadow banking may pose 
to the rest of the fi nancial system. The FSB led reforms 
are mainly focused on risks from banks’ interactions 
with other fi nancial institutions, risk from money 
market mutual funds (MMMFs), securitisation, and 
securities lending and repos.
Role of shadow banking in India
3.36  The reach of the banking sector to effi ciently 
cater to all segments of population in far fl ung areas 
is limited and to some extent entities in non-bank 
sector have been fi lling this gap. Some parts of this 
Chart 3.2: Public Deposits of NBFCs16
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns 
16 Public deposits of NBFC-D and Residuary Non-Banking Companies (RNBCs) are included. RNBCs belong to a separate class of NBFCs, and have as their 
principal business, the receiving of deposits, under any scheme or arrangement or in any other manner and not being Investment, Asset Financing, 
Loan Company.
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taking companies increased during this period. In 
view of these trends and the changing profi le of the 
NBFC sector, the Reserve Bank has subsequently 
extended the regulatory requirements applicable to 
NBFC-D category (in respect of capital adequacy and 
credit concentration norms) to the non-deposit taking 
but systemically important NBFCs (NBFC-ND-SI) also. 
Charts 3.3 and 3.4 give the trends in number of 
companies and total assets of NBFCs in the categories 
of NBFC-D and NBFC-ND-SI.
Proposed Regulatory Changes for NBFC Sector
3.38 The NBFC sector is presently in the process of 
a regulatory overhaul. The Working Group on NBFCs 
in its report submitted in August 2011 has made far 
reaching recommendations; both to ensure the 
resilience of the NBFC sector and to contain risks 
emanating from the sector in the context of overall 
financial stability. The draft guidelines based on 
recommendations of the Working Group have been 
placed in public domain for comments in December 
2012 and the fi nal guidelines are expected shortly. 
The major recommendations can broadly be divided 
into four categories, namely (i) Entry Point norms, 
Principal Business Criteria, Multiple and Captive 
NBFCs; (ii) Corporate Governance including 
Disclosures, (iii) Liquidity management and 
(iv) Prudential regulation including capital adequacy, 
asset provisioning, risk weights for certain sensitive 
exposures, and restrictions on deposit acceptance.
Money Market Mutual Funds
Low Retail Participation
3.39 In India, MMMFs and liquid fund schemes are 
regulated within the ambit of SEBI (Mutual Funds) 
Regulations 1996. The MMMFs are those mutual 
funds which are set up with the objective of investing 
exclusively in money market instruments. The Liquid 
mutual fund schemes can make investment in / 
purchase debt and money market securities with 
residual maturity of up to 91 days. Presently, the 
MMMFs and liquid funds are mainly used by the 
Chart 3.4: Total Assets of NBFC-D and NBFC-ND-SI
Chart 3.3: Number of  Companies- NBFC-D and NBFC-ND-SI
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns 
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns 
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institutional investors as an investment vehicle which 
is accessible, convenient and cost-effective with 
protection of the principal and liquidity. At the end 
of March, 2013, the net assets under management 
(AUM) of MMMFs/Liquid funds in India was around 
`934 billion, with 98 per cent of the contributions 
coming from non-retail investors. The MMMFs 
account for 19 per cent of the total AUM of the debt 
mutual funds which, in turn, form 71 per cent of the 
whole mutual fund sector.
Absence of Constant Net Asset Value Feature
3.40 As constant Net Asset Value (NAV) MMMFs do 
not exist in India, the risks observed in some 
advanced jurisdictions, especially the US, are not 
relevant. The valuation norms have been reviewed 
by SEBI and accordingly the overarching and 
overriding principles of fair valuation were outlined 
in a notification issued in February 2012. This 
included valuation of securities of all maturities 
refl ective of the realisable value/ fair value. All debt 
and money market securities across maturities are to 
be valued at the weighted average price at which they 
are traded on the particular valuation day and in case 
such securities are not traded on a particular valuation 
day then the securities with residual maturity up to 
60 days are to be valued on amortisation basis and 
securities with residual maturity over 60 days have 
to be valued at benchmark yield/ matrix of spread 
over risk free benchmark yield obtained from agencies 
entrusted for the said purpose, provided such 
valuation is be refl ective of the realisable value/ fair 
value of the securities/assets.
Liquidity Risks of Short Term Debt Funds - 
Regulatory Measures
3.41 The liquid funds and other short term debt 
funds in India had faced severe liquidity strain from 
redemption pressures, as an impact of the global 
fi nancial crisis during 2008-09. The Reserve Bank had 
facilitated a short term liquidity window to mutual 
funds to help ease liquidity pressures. Subsequently, 
a number of prudential measures were put in place 
to help the mutual funds withstand the impact of 
such events of liquidity stress in future.
3.42 These regulatory measures included the 
restriction on investments of Liquid funds to 
instruments of up to 91 day residual maturity (as 
against 182 days permitted earlier), with a view to 
addressing the asset liability mismatches in open 
ended schemes. The listing of close ended mutual 
fund schemes has been made mandatory to provide 
investors with an exit option. Also, the close ended 
schemes are allowed to invest in securities of residual 
maturities not exceeding the maturity of the scheme 
itself, for a better asset liability management. The 
provisions regarding uniform cut-off timings for 
applicability of NAV of mutual fund schemes/plans 
were modifi ed. The application for investment has to 
be recognised only after the funds are available for 
utilisation before the cut-off time without availing 
any credit facility. Further, to address the credit and 
concentration risks, no mutual fund scheme is 
allowed to invest more than thirty percent of its net 
assets in money market instruments of an issuer, 
except for investments in Government securities, 
treasury bills and collateralised borrowing and lending 
obligation (CBLO).
Circular Flow of Funds between Banks and Liquid 
Mutual Funds
3.43 In recent years, banks’ investments in liquid 
schemes of mutual funds have grown manifold17. The 
liquid schemes continue to rely heavily on institutional 
investors such as commercial banks whose redemption 
requirements are likely to be large and simultaneous. 
On the other hand, these mutual funds are large 
lenders in the over-night money market instruments 
such as CBLO and market repo, where banks are large 
borrowers. The various schemes of mutual funds also 
invest heavily in certifi cates of deposit (CDs) of banks. 
17  Section 2.12 of Chapter II of this Report may also be seen.
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Such circular fl ow of funds between banks and mutual 
funds could lead to systemic risk in times of liquidity 
stress. With a view to address these risks, the Reserve 
Bank has stipulated that the total investment by banks 
in liquid/short term debt schemes of mutual funds 
with weighted average maturity of portfolio of not 
more than 1 year will be subject to a prudential cap 
of 10 per cent of their net worth as on March 31 of 
the previous year.
Regulatory Gaps in Collective Investment Schemes
3.44 Some instances have come to light of certain 
individuals / companies raising money from public 
by taking advantage of the lack of clarity about in the 
legal provisions and roles of different agencies like 
Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA), SEBI, RBI, State 
Governments, and Registrar of Co-operative Societies 
etc. This highlights the need for extending the 
regulatory perimeter and also plugging the regulatory 
gaps in the existing framework.
Role of State Governments and Law Enforcement 
Agencies
3.45 As an immediate interim measure to address 
the regulatory gap, there is greater focus on information 
sharing and increased co-ordination among the 
existing regulators, with an active role for the State 
Governments. There is also a need for a greater 
involvement of and coordination with the law 
enforcement agencies, through the platforms like 
State level Coordination Committees (SLCC). However, 
despite all efforts to fi ll regulatory gaps, the risk 
appetite and vulnerability of the individual investors 
to succumb to promises of high returns are diffi cult 
to curb. The regulators have taken measures, from 
time to time, to caution the public and investors to 
avoid getting lured by various schemes promising  fast 
and high rates of return. 
Market conduct and Consumer protection
3.46 Intense competition and perverse incentive 
structures have frequently led to widespread mis-
selling of products and misdirection of clients to 
inappropriate and risky investments by fi nancial 
service providers. The instances of mis-selling of 
products have been observed across customer groups, 
such as faulty derivatives to corporates (for hedging 
their exposures) or inappropriate insurance products 
to individuals. The reputation risk for individual 
institutions indulging in such activities for short term 
gains is high. Against this backdrop, regulation is 
increasingly tilting towards strengthening the aspects 
of consumer protection and market conduct in the 
fi nancial sector.
Bancassurance 
Mis-selling 
3.47 Under, ‘bancassurance’ model, banks in India 
have been permitted to undertake insurance business 
as agents of insurance companies subject to certain 
conditions and without any risk participation since 
August 2000. As announced in the Union Budget 
2013-14, it is proposed to permit banks to act as 
insurance brokers so that the entire network of bank 
branches will be utilised to increase the penetration 
of insurance services in the country. As insurance 
brokers the banks will be able to sell insurance 
products of any company, as against the restriction 
of only one company applicable under the agent-
principal model. 
Use of unfair and restrictive practices
3.48 While banks are well suited to distribute 
insurance products because of their wide network, 
several issues have arisen regarding their conduct in 
the process, generally  pertaining to mis-selling and 
certain restrictive / unfair practices (such as linking 
provision of locker facilities to purchase of insurance 
products, selling of unsuitable and/or multiple 
policies etc.). 
3.49 It was observed that in some cases, banks did 
not have clear segregation of duties of marketing 
personnel from other branch functions and bank 
employees were directly receiving incentives from 
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third parties such as insurance companies, mutual 
funds and other entities for selling their products. In 
some cases direct incentives to the bank staff have 
created distortions in the sales structure. 
3.50 According to IRDA’s Annual Report 2011-12 the 
maximum complaints in life insurance related to 
mis-selling. They also mainly pertained to the private 
sector, though LIC leads the business with over 70 
per cent share. The type of complaints were mainly 
in the nature of unfair trade practices and mis-selling 
of products (e.g. malpractices, actual product sold 
being different from what was proposed, single 
premium policy being issued as annual premium 
policy, surrender value being different from projected, 
free look refund not paid, misappropriation of 
premiums etc). As a signifi cant portion of private life 
insurance companies use banks as their corporate 
agents, there seems to be an urgent need to revisit 
the marketing and sales strategies used by the banks 
in pushing insurance products, especially since 
insurance is among the more complex of fi nancial 
products for the common man to fully comprehend. 
Recently, banks in the UK have also been penalised 
for mis-selling of payment protection insurance to 
their lending/ credit card customers.  
3.51 The limits on commission structure and the 
operating expenses of insurance companies are laid 
down in the Insurance Act, 1938 and the Rules framed 
there under. The compliance with these limits is being 
monitored by IRDA on an annual basis, and instances 
of breach are dealt with through penal action. In 
recent past, there have been instances of both 
insurance companies as also the corporate agents 
(banks) being penalised.
3.52 Banks have been advised to disclose to the 
customers, details of all the commissions / other fees 
(in any form) received, if any, from the various 
companies for marketing / referring their products, 
even in cases where the bank is marketing/ distributing/ 
referring products of only one company. As a further 
step in enhancing transparency,  banks have also been 
advised to disclose details of fees / remuneration 
received in respect of the bancassurance business 
undertaken by them  in the ‘Notes to Accounts’, from 
the year ending March 31, 2010. Similar disclosures 
and codes of conduct for insurance companies have 
been prescribed by IRDA also. The IRDA is working 
with the RBI to ensure that the disclosure made by 
the banks acting as corporate agents, in the Notes to 
Accounts are enhanced to bring about transparency 
in the nature of payments received by them.
Mis-selling in Wealth Management and Other 
Related Activities
3.53 Wealth Management Services (WMS) generally 
include referral services, Investment Advisory 
Services (IAS) and Portfolio Management Services 
(PMS). In India, banks are permitted to offer very 
limited services, mainly advisory and referral services.
3.54 Grievances relating to mis-selling, whereby 
products that are unsuitable for a particular customer, 
either for commission-linked reasons or lack of 
knowledge, clarity regarding accountability between 
the product issuer and the advisor/portfolio manager, 
need to be addressed by improving consumer 
protection measures. The issues have been widely 
debated in the inter-regulatory technical group of the 
FSDC Sub Committee and a review of the extant 
guidelines on wealth management services offered by 
banks is being carried out. The aspects on marketing 
and distribution of third party fi nancial products by 
banks also need to be factored in while issuing 
comprehensive guidelines on Wealth Management 
Services by banks.
3.55 The recently notified SEBI (Investment 
Advisers) Regulations, 2013, contain detailed norms 
for risk profiling and suitability, creation of a 
Separately Identifi able Department or Division (SIDD) 
for IAS, detailed disclosure to the clients including 
any conflicts of interest, redressal of investor 
grievances, etc. Such norms are expected to address 
mis-selling risks to a certain extent.
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Need for Stronger Operational Procedures
3.56 All fi nancial sector entities need to comply with 
the extant KYC, which are meant for safeguarding the 
fi nancial system against the possibility of its use for 
money laundering. There is a move for simplifying the 
KYC guidelines and also towards achieving a uniform 
basic KYC structure for various segments of the 
fi nancial system.
3.57 In the wake of recent episodes reported in the 
media, the Reserve Bank undertook investigations to 
examine the practices at certain banks involving 
structuring of transactions to aid tax evasion and 
fraudulent transfer of funds. Some of these practices 
related to sale of third party products such as insurance 
and wealth management services which have been 
discussed in previous sections. The main fi ndings 
point towards laxity in adherence to the Know Your 
Customer / Anti Money Laundering (KYC/AML) 
guidelines by banks.
3.58 The areas where banks are required to adopt 
more focussed strategies to ensure adherence to KYC/
AML measures include, among other things, 
monitoring large value transactions in newly opened 
accounts, operational control over multiple customer 
identities for the same customer, enhanced skill sets 
in dealing with money laundering alerts, quicker 
follow-up and escalation of suspicious transactions. 
Such measures also relate to accelerated review of 
risk categorisation at prescribed intervals, need for 
review of alert thresholds in AML monitoring systems 
in tune with changing dimensions of transactions in 
various accounts. Further, the banks need to address 
the concerns on tackling technological issues 
involved in updating changes in customers’ details 
over phone lines or through internet banking leading 
to frauds, diligent adoption of single and enhanced 
due diligence (SDD/EDD) measures for ascertaining 
and updating KYC details of customers, dealing with 
issues relating to splitting of transactions with a view 
to avoid anti-money laundering checks etc.
3.59 The supervisory efforts of the Reserve Bank 
have been combined with ‘guidance’ in the form of 
specifi c circulars and the broad regulatory guidelines 
issued to the banks on the subject. Such guidance has 
covered aspects relating to (i) IT initiatives to be taken 
by banks for enabling appropriate risk based 
transaction monitoring mechanism, (ii) dedicated KYC 
Audits, (ii) recommending operational aspects relating 
to risk profi ling, (iv) fi ctitious offers of funds/fake 
lottery rackets/phishing etc.
Technology Risks18 in the Changing Business 
Environment
3.60 Alongside the rapidly increasing use of 
technology in banking and fi nance in recent years, 
the risks emanating from abuse and failure of 
technology have also risen. The recent cases of cyber 
frauds at some banks have highlighted the increasing 
complexity, sophistication and diversity in the risks 
to the security and integrity of technology based 
banking and fi nance. Globally, the use of online and 
mobile technologies is driving the proliferation of 
virtual banks, virtual currencies (Box 3.4) and 
provision of banking and payment services by un-
licensed entities. While leveraging on technology has 
resulted in many benefi ts, especially, in extending 
the reach of the fi nancial services, these developments 
pose challenges in the form of regulatory, legal and 
operational risks.
3.61 One of the main risks related to the information 
technology (IT) systems in banks relates to the 
obsolescence of the technology and processes built 
according to the needs of the then prevailing 
regulatory-cum-business environment. Therefore, a 
18  Technology risks relate to any adverse outcome, damage, loss, disruption, violation, irregularity or failure arising from the use of or reliance on computer 
hardware, software, electronic devices, online networks and telecommunications systems. These risks can also be associated with systems failures, 
processing errors, software defects, operating mistakes, hardware breakdowns, capacity defi ciencies, network vulnerabilities, control weaknesses, security 
shortcomings, internal sabotage, espionage, malicious attacks, hacking incidents, fraudulent conduct and defective recovery capabilities.
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A virtual currency can be defi ned as a type of unregulated, 
digital money, which is issued and usually controlled by 
its developers, and used and accepted among the members 
of a specifi c virtual community19. The virtual currency 
schemes provide a financial incentive for virtual 
community users to continue to participate and are able 
to generate ‘fl oat’ revenue for their owners. They also 
provide a high level of fl exibility regarding the business 
model and business strategy for the virtual community.
There are different kinds of virtual currency schemes in 
vogue at present. While for some kinds of virtual 
currencies there is no interaction or exchangeability with 
the ‘real’ currency, for others the relationship with the 
real money, goods and services is more active and direct. 
The ‘closed’ virtual currency schemes, which are mostly 
used in online games, have no connection with the real 
money. Some virtual currency schemes offer the facility 
of a (mostly unidirectional) conversion rate for purchasing 
the virtual currency, which can subsequently be used to 
buy virtual goods and services. Under another category 
of virtual currency schemes which provide for bidirectional 
fl ows, the virtual currency acts like any other convertible 
currency, with two exchange rates (buy and sell). In such 
schemes, the virtual currency can be used to buy not only 
the virtual goods and services, but also to purchase real 
goods and services. Virtual currency schemes are different 
from electronic money schemes as the virtual currency 
being used as the unit of account has no physical 
counterpart with legal tender status.
A virtual currency scheme may also be designed to 
compete with traditional currencies used for international 
trade. The absence of a distinct legal framework implies 
that the traditional rules under fi nancial sector regulation 
and supervision, including the institution of central 
banks, are not involved in the case of virtual currency. 
Also, the unregulated link between virtual currency (if 
permitted), and traditional currency with a legal tender 
status poses challenges as the complete control over the 
differently denominated virtual currency is given to its 
issuer, who governs the scheme and manages the supply 
of money at will.
The regulators are studying the impact of online payment 
options and virtual currencies to determine potential 
risks associated with them.
Box 3.4: Virtual Currency Schemes
19  ECB (2010), “Virtual Currency Schemes”, Report by the European Central Bank, October
20  http://rbi.org.in/scripts/Notifi cationUser.aspx?Id=7874&Mode=0
review of suitability of the existing IT infrastructure 
is required to be carried out to assess the capability 
of the IT systems to handle the changing demands of 
business and compliance functions in the evolving 
environment.
Need for Review of IT Risk Management Framework
3.62 Globally, the management of IT systems is being 
increasingly outsourced. There is a wide spread trend 
of further sub-contracting of some of the sub-
processes by the primary outsourcer to third parties, 
which exposes the clients to transfer risks. The legal 
issues, pricing and service level agreement (SLA) 
terms with the outsourced vendor play an important 
role in case of a dispute with the outsourced vendor 
who has the responsibility of completing the assigned 
responsibility. With this, risks relating to security 
and reputation come to the fore, which need to be 
dealt with carefully.
3.63 In view of the risks arising out increased use 
of technology, there is a need for banks to implement 
systems and processes to establish a robust technology 
risk management framework. There is a need for 
these institutions to put in place adequate risk 
mitigation techniques and security controls to ensure 
business continuity. Further, banks and regulators 
have to play a proactive role in increasing the 
fi nancial awareness of their customers, especially 
under the IT environment. The regulators have taken 
various measures to address the emerging technology 
risks in their respective areas, e.g. the Reserve Bank 
has issued additional guidelines20 to the banks on 
securing card transactions and electronic payment 
transactions.
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Financial Market Infrastructure
Compliance with International Standards in 
Financial Market Infrastructure
3.64 India is committed to the adoption and 
implementation of the international standards and 
best practices in payment systems including, the new 
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems 
(CPSS)-IOSCO standards Principles of Financial 
Market Infrastructures (PFMIs). The oversight 
framework for CCIL is proposed to be drawn up based 
the PFMIs and CCIL was assessed using the assessment 
methodology of the PFMIs. As found from this 
exercise, CCIL has implemented several measures to 
strengthen its risk management framework which 
include complete revamp of the margining system in 
Securities Segment, implementation of changes to 
forex forwards regulations pertaining to exit option 
for members, limited liability for members and 
computation of default fund etc.
3.65 The Securities and Exchange Board of India 
(SEBI) has also examined the policies related to 
technology risk management being followed by the 
Financial Market Infrastructures (FMIs) under its 
regulatory jurisdiction, viz. exchanges, clearing 
corporations and depositories. It has been found that 
while there were no major technology risks to the 
functioning of FMIs at present, the technology 
infrastructure needed to be geared to meet the newer 
challenges.
Payment and Settlement Systems
3.66 The payment and settlement systems (PSS) 
forming the major part of the FMI play a vital role in 
ensuring fi nancial stability. The PSS infrastructure in 
India continued to perform without any major 
disruptions. The broad policy direction of the Reserve 
Bank, which has the legislative authority to regulate 
and supervise PSS in the country, is inclined to 
migrating an increasing proportion of all payment 
transactions, especially the large value / wholesale 
transactions, to the electronic payment products.
Risks from High Frequency Trading
3.67 The previous FSRs had covered the potential 
risks from high-frequency trading (HFT) in equity 
markets. Even as the risks from HFT specifi c to the 
segments of the market are being addressed, the 
nature of the HFT and the associated risks are 
undergoing a transformation due to innovations like 
‘big data21’. The ‘new HFT’22 using analytics and 
algorithms based on ‘big data’ attempt to develop 
trading strategies by extracting information on 
market sentiments from the enormous amount of 
information available on internet including the 
social media. As the use of big data is transforming 
the fi nancial markets, the regulations also need to 
keep pace.
Regulation of Algorithmic Trading in Indian Equity 
Markets
3.68 At present, Algorithmic trading (Algo) and HFT 
account for only about 14 per cent of the cash market 
turnover in the Indian exchanges as against 80 per 
cent in developed markets like US and Europe. A 
proper regulatory structure and continuous monitoring 
of regulatory systems would avert, inter alia, 
operational risks and other risks posed by Algo and 
HFT. As algorithmic trading is an evolving fi eld, SEBI 
and stock exchanges are continuously studying the 
practice and taking steps as deemed necessary to 
minimise the associated risks and to better regulate 
the same.
3.69 India is one of the few securities markets in the 
world to implement a framework regulating the 
practice of algorithmic trading. SEBI has issued 
instructions in March 2012 which inter alia included 
a list of minimum order-level checks to be performed 
21 The term ‘big data’ refers to large or /and complex data sets which cannot be effi ciently managed with the standard software tools.
22 Shah S, A. Horne and J. Copella (2012), ‘‘Good Data Won’t Guarantee Good Decisions’’, Harvard Business Review, April
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on algorithmic orders, framework for penalising cases 
of high order-to-trade ratios and framework of 
conformance testing of new algorithms. Other risk 
management measures that have also been mandated 
include increase in the Base Minimum Capital (BMC) 
of the trading members that undertake algorithmic 
trading and changes to the practice of enablement of 
the trading terminals of the trading members that 
were disabled upon exhaustion of the collateral. In 
continuum to the earlier instructions, SEBI has laid 
down further guidelines by specifying that the stock 
brokers / trading members that provide the facility of 
algorithmic trading shall subject their algorithmic 
trading system to a system audit every six months in 
order to ensure that the requirements prescribed by 
SEBI / stock exchanges with regard to algorithmic 
trading are effectively implemented.
Need for ensuring fairness in order management 
under co-location facility
3.70 SEBI is presently examining various issues, as 
part of proposed measures to better regulate the 
facility of co-location. SEBI’s proposals seek to provide 
greater equality and fairness in order handling to the 
participants that do not use co-location services vis-
à-vis participants that place orders using automated 
trading system and are co-located at the stock 
exchange.
Erroneous Trades on the Stock Exchanges – Measures 
Taken
3.71 “Error Trades” are transactions that result from 
system or human error in entering the order 
parameters such as name of the security, volume to 
be traded, price for trade, etc. Such unintended trades 
usually have an adverse effect on the price formation 
and impact orderly trading. While incidents of 
erroneous orders are few as compared to the total 
number of orders handled by the exchanges in a year, 
measures implemented by the stock exchanges such 
as ‘upfront real-time risk management system’, ‘scrip-
level price bands’ and ‘market-wide index circuit 
breakers’, are expected to limit the damage that may 
result from erroneous orders. SEBI has also taken 
measures to strengthen the pre-trade risk management 
framework by introducing Value per order Limit, 
Cumulative limit on value of unexecuted orders of a 
stock broker, Dummy price bands and Risk Reduction 
Mode etc.
Exposure of Settlement Guarantee Funds of Clearing 
Houses to banks
3.72 In the screen-based trading environment where 
counterparties to trade are anonymous, Clearing 
Corporation/ Clearing House of a Stock Exchange acts 
as a CCP and guarantees settlement of net obligations 
arising out of trades executed on the stock exchange. 
Under this arrangement, the CCP assumes the risks 
of unsettled transactions on behalf of the brokers and 
their ultimate clients. In order to mitigate these risks, 
the CCP maintains a Settlement Guarantee Fund (SGF) 
and collects margins which comprise of contributions 
from brokers/clients in the form of Bank Guarantees 
and securities (which may in turn be issued by banks) 
amongst others. The CCP is thus exposed to the banks 
both directly and indirectly and therefore CCPs are 
interconnected to Banks they are exposed to. This 
interconnectedness of CCPs to banks can be a 
potential source of systemic contagion, in case of 
failure of a bank.
Concentration of Exposure of CCPs to Banks
3.73 SEBI, in its guidelines issued in February 2005, 
had specifi ed that the stock exchanges shall lay down 
exposure limits either in absolute terms or as 
percentage of the Trade Guarantee Fund (TGF) / SGF 
that can be exposed to a single bank directly or 
indirectly. The total exposure includes guarantees 
provided by the bank for itself or for others, as well 
as debt or equity securities of the bank which have 
been deposited by members towards total liquid 
assets.
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3.74 Accordingly, National Securities Clearing 
Corporation Limited (NSCCL), the clearing house of 
the National Stock Exchange (NSE) has specifi ed a 
maximum exposure limit of 15 per cent of SGF for a 
single bank in respect of bank guarantee and bank 
securities that can be accepted as collaterals. These 
norms are periodically monitored for adherence to 
specifi ed limits. NSCCL accepts collaterals issued by 
empanelled banks in the specifi ed forms namely bank 
guarantees and fi xed deposit receipts. Currently there 
are 58 empanelled banks with NSCCL for the purpose, 
while Indian Clearing Corporation Limited (ICCL) of 
the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) accepts Bank 
Guarantees issued by Schedule Commercial Banks 
only. SEBI also has specifi ed that not more than 5 per 
cent of the TGF/SGF or 1 per cent of the total liquid 
assets (TLA) deposited with the exchange, whichever 
is lower, shall be exposed to any single bank which 
has a net worth of less than ` 5 Biliion and is not rated 
P1 (or P1+) or equivalent, by a RBI recognised credit 
rating agency or by a reputed foreign credit rating 
agency, and not more than 50 per cent of the TGF/
SGF or 10 per cent of the total liquid assets deposited 
with the exchanges, whichever is lower, shall be 
exposed to all such banks put together.
Possible Concentration Risks Due to Common Set 
of Banks
3.75 The exposures of SGFs of NSCCL and ICCL, to 
the top five banks (Table 3.2) are adequately 
diversifi ed. As per the exposure limits specifi ed by 
NSCCL, SGF can have the highest exposure of 75 per 
cent to top fi ve banks put together. While the exposure 
of the SGF of NSCCL and the exposure of the SGF of 
ICCL are individually less than the upper limit, the 
fact that four banks are common in the list of top fi ve 
banks, makes it even more important that the 
exposures limits are monitored on an ongoing basis.
Table 3.2: Exposure of NSCCL and ICCL to top fi ve banks 
(as on March 31, 2013)
NSCCL ICCL
Sl. 
No.
Bank Name Exposure as 
a % of SGF
Sl. 
No.
Bank Name Exposure as 
a % of SGF
1. Bank 1 8.09 1. Bank 1 7.63
2. Bank 2 4.85 2. Bank 2 6.13
3. Bank 3 4.65 3. Bank 3 3.38
4. Bank 4 2.92 4. Bank 4 1.78
5. Bank 5 1.85 5. Bank 5 1.42
Total Exposure to 
Top 5 Banks
22.76 Total Exposure to 
Top 5 Banks
20.34
Note: In case of BSE exposure is a % of SGF+Total Liquid Assets
Source: NSE & BSE
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Systemic Risk Survey
 The Systemic Risk Survey (SRS) was initiated by the Reserve Bank in October 2011 to capture the views of 
market participants and other stakeholders on the aggregate risks facing the fi nancial system. The present Survey 
was conducted in April 2013.
 As the factors driving the on-going turmoil in global fi nancial markets have been changing, the perception 
of market participants has also changed from the fi rst round of SRS conducted in October 2011 to the latest round 
conducted in April 2013. Deterioration in asset quality and market volatility were perceived to be important factors 
affecting the fi nancial system during the fi rst SRS. As per the latest survey, market participants perceive global 
and macro-economic risks to be the most important factors affecting the fi nancial system. Majority of respondents 
feel that there is medium chance of a high impact event occurring in the global fi nancial system, whereas, in the 
fi rst SRS, the chance of occurrence of high impact event in the global fi nancial system was high. The participants, 
however, continued to have fair confi dence in the stability of the Indian fi nancial system (Table 1).
 Among the global risks, declining global growth, sovereign risk/contagion and global infl ation are polled as 
prominent factors. Deterioration of the domestic outlook, domestic infl ation, elevated current account defi cit, 
high fi scal defi cit and lack / slow pace of infrastructure development are major macroeconomic risks identifi ed 
by participants. The foreign exchange risk, funding risk, asset quality deterioration and low credit off-take have 
also been mentioned as risks facing the Indian fi nancial system (Table 2).
 Survey respondents felt that there was a medium chance of a high impact event occurring in the Indian 
fi nancial system in the next half-year period.  The stakeholders had medium level of confi dence in the stability 
of the global fi nancial system as a whole. There is a perception that if instability in the global fi nancial system 
escalates in the next six months, the stability of the Indian economy would be impacted strongly. However, the 
survey also indicates that the participants are fairly confi dent of the stability of the Indian fi nancial system 
(Table 3). Further, the perception has remained mostly unchanged during the past half-year (Chart 1).
Table 1: Major Risk Groups identifi ed in Systemic Risk Survey – April 2013
Major Risk Groups Apr-13 Shift Oct-12 Shift Apr-12 Shift Oct-11
A. Global Risks   
B. Macro-economic Risks   
C. Market Risks   
D. Institutional Risks   
E. General Risks   
Note:
Risk Category
Very high High Medium Low Very low
Change in risk since last survey
  
Increased Same Decreased
The risk perception as emanating from the systemic risk survey conducted at different time points (on half yearly basis in April and October), may 
shift (increase/ decrease) from one category to the other, which is refl ected by change in colour. However, within the same risk category (i.e. the 
boxes with same colour), the risk perception may also increase/ decrease or remain the same, which have been shown by the arrows. The shift in 
risk perception is between two consecutive surveys.
Source: RBI, Systemic Risk Surveys – October 2011 to April 2013
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Table 2: Various Risks identifi ed in Systemic Risk Survey – April 2013
Risk Item Apr-13 Changes Oct-12
A
. G
lo
ba
l R
is
ks
Global slow down 
Sovereign Risk / Contagion 
Funding Risk  (External Borrowings) 
Global Infl ation / Commodity Price Risk (including crude oil prices) 
Other Global Risks 
B.
 M
ac
ro
-e
co
no
m
ic
 R
is
ks
Deterioration in domestic economic outlook 
Domestic Infl ation 
Current Account Defi cit 
Capital infl ows/ outfl ows (Reversal of FIIs, Slow down in FDI) 
Sovereign rating downgrade 
Fiscal Risk (High Fiscal defi cit) 
Corporate Sector Risk (High Leverage/ Low Profi tability) 
Lack / Slow pace of  Infrastructure development 
Real Estate Prices 
Household savings 
Political Risk 
Other Macroeconomic Risks 
C
. M
ar
ke
t 
Ri
sk
s
Foreign Exchange Rate Risk 
Equity Price Volatility 
Funding Risk / Liquidity Risk/ Interest Rate Risk  
Other Market Risks 
D
. I
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
al
 
Ri
sk
s
Regulatory Risk 
Asset quality deterioration 
Additional capital requirements of banks 
Funding diffi culties of banks 
Low credit off-take 
Excessive credit growth 
Operational Risk 
Other Institutional Risks 
E.
 G
en
er
al
 
Ri
sk
s
Terrorism 
Natural disaster 
Social unrest (Increasing inequality) 
Other General Risks 
Note:
Risk Category
Very high High Medium Low Very low
Change in risk since last survey
  
Increased Same Decreased
The risk perception as emanating from the systemic risk survey conducted at different time points (on half yearly basis in April and October), may 
shift (increase/ decrease) from one category to the other, which is refl ected by change in colour. However, within the same risk category (i.e. the 
boxes with same colour), the risk perception may also increase/ decrease or remain the same, which have been shown by the arrows. The shift in 
risk perception is between two consecutive surveys
Source: RBI, Systemic Risk Surveys – October 2012 and April 2013
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Table 3: Perception on occurrence of high impact events and their impact on Indian fi nancial system
A : High impact event occurring in the global fi nancial system in the period ahead (In Short Term : upto 1 year)
B : High impact event occurring in the global fi nancial system in the period ahead (In Medium Term : 1 to 3 years)
C : High impact event occurring in the Indian fi nancial system in the period ahead (In Short Term : upto 1 year)
D : High impact event occurring in the Indian fi nancial system in the period ahead (In Medium Term : 1 to 3 years)
E : Confi dence in the stability of the global fi nancial system as a whole
F : Expectation that instability in the global fi nancial system, if it escalates in the next six months, would affect the 
stability of the Indian economy
G : Confi dence in the stability of the Indian fi nancial system
Note:
Risks
A - D Very high High Medium Low Very low
E &G No confi dence Not very confi dent Fairly confi dent Very confi dent Complete confi dence
F Affect signifi cantly Affect to a large extent Affect somewhat Affect to a limited 
extent
No impact
Source: RBI, Systemic Risk Survey – April 2013
A : High impact event occurring in the global fi nancial system in the period 
ahead (In Short Term: upto 1 year)
B : High impact event occurring in the global fi nancial system in the period 
ahead (In Medium Term: 1 to 3 years)
C : High impact event occurring in the Indian fi nancial system in the period 
ahead (In Short Term: upto 1 year)
D : High impact event occurring in the Indian fi nancial system in the period 
ahead (In Medium Term: 1 to 3 years)
E : Confi dence in the stability of the global fi nancial system as a whole
F : Confi dence in the stability of the Indian fi nancial system
Chart 1: Change in Perception over the past six months
Source: RBI, Systemic Risk Survey – April 2013
 Annex-1
69
Financial Stability Report June 2013  
Annex-2
Methodologies
Macroeconomic Stability Map
The Macroeconomic Stability Map is based on seven sub-indices, each pertaining to a specifi c area of macroeconomic 
risk. Each sub-index on macroeconomic risk includes select parameters representing risks in that particular fi eld. 
These sub-indices have been selected based on their impact on macroeconomic or fi nancial variable such as GDP, 
infl ation, interest rates or assets quality of banks. The seven sub-indices of the overall macroeconomic stability 
index and their components are briefl y described below:
Global Index: The global index is based on output growth of the world economy. A fall in output growth affects 
overall sentiments for the domestic economy in general and has implications for demand for domestic exports, 
in particular. Capital fl ows to the domestic economy are also affected by growth at the global level. Therefore, a 
fall in output growth is associated with increased risks.
Domestic Growth: The domestic growth index is based on growth of gross domestic product. A fall in growth, 
usually, creates headwinds for bank asset quality, capital fl ows and over-all macroeconomic stability. Hence, a fall 
in growth is associated with increased risks.
Infl ation: Wholesale Price Index Infl ation is used to arrive at the Infl ation Index. Increase in infl ation reduces 
purchasing power of individuals and complicates investment decision of corporate. Therefore, an increase in 
infl ation is associated with higher risks.
External Vulnerability Index: The Current Account Defi cit to GDP Ratio, Reserves Cover of Imports and ratio 
of Short Term Debt to Total Debt are included in the external vulnerability Index. Rising CAD and ratio of short 
term debt to total debt and falling Reserves Cover of Imports depict rising vulnerability.
Fiscal Index: The fi scal index is based on fi scal defi cit and primary defi cit. Higher defi cits are associated with 
higher risk. High government defi cit, in general, reduces the resources available to the private sector for 
investment and also has implications for infl ation.
Corporate Index: The health of the corporate sector is captured through profi t margin[ EBITDA (Earnings before 
Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortisation) to Sales], the interest coverage ratio [EBIT (Earnings before Interest, 
Tax) to Interest Payments]. A lower profi t margin and lower interest coverage ratio are associated with higher 
risks.
Household Index: This Index is based on retail non performing assets. Increase in retail NPAs is associated with 
higher risk. 
Financial Markets Stability Map
With the objective to measure stability of the fi nancial market, Financial Market Stability Map has been prepared 
based on the indicators of four sectors/markets namely banking sector, foreign exchange market, equity market 
and debt market. The indicators selected from various sectors/markets are following; i) Banking Sector: Beta 
of CNXBANK Index and NIFTY Index, CD Rate and CD rate minus Implied Forward rate, ii) Foreign Exchange 
Market: CMAX of daily INR-US Dollar exchange rate, which is defi ned as Xt/Max(Xi, i=1,2,..upto one year). Where, 
Xt is the INR-US Dollar exchange rate at time t, and 25 Delta Risk Reversals of foreign exchange rate, iii) Equity 
Market: Inverse of NIFTY CMAX and India VIX, and iv) Debt Market: Corporate bond which is average return of 
corporate bonds rated A, AA, and AAA, 10-years Government bond yield and CP Rate.
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Variance-equal transformation has been used to convert the indicators at same level before construction of the 
Map. Four indicators for the four selected sectors/market were prepared based on simple average of elementary 
indicators which are presented as a cobweb map.
Systemic Liquidity Index
Systemic liquidity in the fi nancial system refers to the liquidity scenario in the banking sector, non-banking 
fi nancial sector, the corporate sector and prevailing foreign currency liquidity. Current needs for liquidity are 
also infl uenced by expectations about availability of funds and their rates in future. The Systemic Liquidity 
Index(SLI) was constructed using the following four indicators representing various segments of the market:
Weighted Average Call Rate minus RBI Repo Rate
3 month Commercial Paper (CP) Rate minus 3 month Certifi cate of Deposits (CD) Rate
3 month CD Rate minus 3 month Forward Implied Deposit Rate
Weighted Average Call Rate minus 3 Month Overnight Index Swap (OIS) Rate
The SLI was derived as a simple average of the Standard normal or Variance-equal transformed values of the 
above mentioned indicators.
Banking Stability Map and Indicator
The Banking Stability Map and Indicator (BSI) present an overall assessment of changes in underlying conditions 
and risk factors that have a bearing on stability of the banking sector during a period. Following ratios are used 
for construction of each composite index:
Table : Indicators used for construction of Banking Stability Map and Banking Stability Indicator
Dimension Ratios
Soundness CRAR Tier-I Capital to Tier-II Capital Leverage ratio as Total-Assets to Capital and Reserves
Asset-Quality Net NPAs to Total-Advances Gross NPAs to Total-Advances Sub-Standard-advances to 
gross NPAs
Restructured-Standard-Advances 
to Standard-Advances
Profi tability Return on Assets Net Interest Margin Growth in Profi t
Liquidity Liquid-Assets to Total-Assets Customer-Deposits to Total-
Assets
Non-Bank-Advances to 
Customer-Deposits
Deposits maturing within-1-year 
to Total Deposits
Effi ciency Cost to Income Business (Credit + Deposits) to staff expenses Staff Expenses to Total Expenses
The fi ve composite indices represent the fi ve dimensions of Soundness, Asset-quality, Profi tability, Liquidity and 
Effi ciency. Each index, representing a dimension of bank functioning, takes values between zero (minimum) and 
1 (maximum). Each index is a relative measure during the sample period used for its construction, where a high 
value means the risk in that dimension is high. Therefore, an increase in the value of the index in any particular 
dimension indicates an increase in risk in that dimension for that period as compared to other periods. For each 
ratio used for a dimension, a weighted average for the banking sectors is derived, where the weights are the 
ratio of individual bank asset to total banking system assets. Each index is normalised for the sample period 
as ‘Ratio-on-a-given-date minus Minimum-value-in-sample-period divided by maximum-value-in-sample-period 
minus Minimum-value-in-sample-period’. A composite measure of each dimension is calculated as a weighted 
average of normalised ratios used for that dimension, where the weights are based on the marks assigned for 
assessment for CAMELS rating. Based on the individual composite indices for each dimension, the Banking 
Stability Indicator is constructed as a simple average of these fi ve composite sub-indices.
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Banking Stability Measures (BSMs) – Distress Dependency Analysis
In order to model distress dependency, methodology described by Goodhart and Segoviano (2009) has been 
followed. First, the banking system has been conceptualised as a portfolio of banks(BIs). Then, the PoD of the 
individual banks, comprising the portfolio, has been inferred from equity prices. Subsequently, using such PoDs 
as inputs (exogenous variables) and employing the Consistent Information Multivariate Density Optimizing 
(CIMDO) methodology (Segoviano, 2006), which is a non-parametric approach based on cross-entropy, the banking 
system’s portfolio multivariate density (BSMD) have been derived. Lastly, from the BSMD a set of conditional 
PoDs of specifi c pairs of BIs, and the banking system’s joint PoD(JPoD) are estimated.
The BSMD and thus, the estimated conditional probabilities and the JPoD, embed the banks’ distress dependency. 
This captures the linear (correlation) and non-linear dependencies among the BIs in the portfolio, and allows for 
these to change throughout the economic cycle. These are key advantages over traditional risk models that most 
of the time incorporate only correlations, and assume that they are constant throughout the economic cycle.
Network Analysis
Matrix algebra is at the core of network analysis, which is essentially an analysis of bilateral exposures between 
entities in the fi nancial sector. Each institution’s lending and borrowings with all others in the system are 
plotted in a square matrix and are then mapped in a network graph. The network model uses various statistical 
measures to gauge the level of interconnectedness in the system. Some of the most important are as follows:
Connectivity: This is a statistic that measures the extent of links between the nodes relative to all possible links 
in a complete graph.
Cluster Coeffi cient: Clustering in networks measures how interconnected each node is. Specifi cally, there 
should be an increased probability that two of a node’s neighbours (banks’ counterparties in case of the fi nancial 
network) are also neighbours themselves. A high clustering coeffi cient for the network corresponds with high 
local interconnectedness prevailing in the system.
Shortest Path Length: This gives the average number of directed links between a node and each of the other 
nodes in the network. Those nodes with the shortest path can be identifi ed as hubs in the system.
In-betweeness centrality: This statistic reports how the shortest path lengths pass through a particular node.
Eigen vector measure of centrality: Eigenvector centrality is a measure of the importance of a node (bank) in a 
network. It describes how connected a node’s neighbours are and attempts to capture more than just the number 
of out degrees or direct ‘neighbours’ a node has. The algorithm assigns relative centrality scores to all nodes in 
the network and a bank’s centrality score is proportional to the sum of the centrality scores of all nodes to which 
it is connected. In general, for an NxN matrix there will be N different eigen values, for which an eigen vector 
solution exists. Each bank has a unique eigen value, which indicates its importance in the system. This measure 
is used in the network analysis to establish the systemic importance of a bank and by far it is the most crucial 
indicator.
Tiered Network Structures: Typically, fi nancial networks tend to exhibit a tiered structure. A tiered structure is 
one where different institutions have different degrees or levels of connectivity with others in the network. In 
the present analysis, the most connected banks (based on their eigen vector measure of centrality) are in the 
inner most core. Banks are then placed in the mid core, outer core and the periphery (the respective concentric 
circles around the centre in the diagrams), based on their level of relative connectivity. The range of connectivity 
of the banks is defi ned as a ratio of each bank’s in degree and out degree divided by that of the most connected 
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bank. Banks that are ranked in the top 10 percentile of this ratio constitute the inner core. This is followed by 
a mid core of banks ranked between 90 and 70 percentile and a 3rd tier of banks ranked between 40 and 70 
percentile. Banks with connectivity ratio of less than 40 per cent are categorised as the periphery.
Solvency Contagion analysis
The contagion analysis is basically a stress test where the gross loss to the banking system owing to a domino 
effect of one or more bank failing is ascertained. We follow the round by round or sequential algorithm for 
simulating contagion that is now well known from Furfi ne (2003). Starting with a trigger bank i that fails at time 
0, we denote the set of banks that go into distress at each round or iteration by Dq, q= 1,2, …For this analysis, 
a bank is considered to be in distress when its core CRAR goes below 6 per cent.
Liquidity Contagion analysis
While the solvency contagion analysis assesses potential loss to the system owing to failure of a net borrower, 
liquidity contagion estimates potential loss to the system due to the failure of a net lender. The analysis is 
conducted on gross exposures between banks. The exposures include fund based and derivatives. The basic 
assumption for the analysis is that a bank will initially dip into its liquidity reserves or buffers to tide over a 
liquidity stress caused by the failure of a large net lender. The items considered under liquidity reserves are (a) 
excess CRR balance; (b) excess SLR balance; (c) available marginal standing facility and (d) available export credit 
refi nance. If a bank is able to meet the stress with the liquidity buffers alone, then there is no further contagion.
However, if the liquidity buffers alone are not suffi cient, then a bank will call in all loans that are ‘callable’, 
resulting in a contagion. For the analysis only short term assets like money lent in the call market and other very 
short term loans are taken as callable. Following this, a bank may survive or may be liquidated. In this case there 
might be instances where a bank may survive by calling in loans, but in turn might propagate a further contagion 
causing other banks to come under duress. The second assumption used is that when a bank is liquidated, the 
funds lent by the bank are called in on a gross basis, whereas when a bank calls in a short term loan without 
being liquidated, the loan is called in on a net basis (on the assumption that the counterparty is likely to fi rst 
reduce its short term lending against the same counterparty).
Macro Stress Testing
To ascertain the resilience of banks against macroeconomic shocks, macro stress test for credit risk was conducted. 
Here, the credit risk indicator was modeled as function of macroeconomic variables, using various econometric 
models that relate banking system aggregate to the macroeconomic variables. The time series econometric 
models being used are; (i) multivariate regression in terms of the slippage ratio; (ii) aggregate VAR using slippage 
ratio; (iv) quantile regression of slippage ratio, (v) multivariate panel regression on bank-group wise slippage 
ratio data; and (vi) multivariate regressions for sectoral NPAs. The banking system aggregates includes current 
and lagged values of slippage ratio, while macroeconomic variables include GDP growth, short term interest rate 
(call rate), WPI infl ation, exports-to-GDP ratio , gross fi scal defi cit-to-GDP ratio  and REER.
While the multivariate regression allows evaluating the impact of selected macroeconomic variables on the 
banking system’s NPA and capital, the VAR model refl ects the impact of the overall economic stress situation on 
the banks’ capital and NPA ratio, which also take into account feed-back effect. In these methods, conditional 
mean of slippage ratio is estimated and assumed that the impact of macro variables on credit quality will 
remain same irrespective of the level of the credit quality, which may not always be true. In order to relax this 
assumption, quantile regression has been adapted to project credit quality, in which, in place of conditional 
mean the conditional quantile has been estimated.
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The Modelling Framework
The following multivariate models were run to estimate the impact of macroeconomic shocks on the GNPA ratio/ 
slippage ratio (SR)1:
 Aggregate banking system multivariate regression
The analysis was carried out on slippage ratio at the aggregate level for the commercial banking system as 
a whole.
 
Where, 
 Vector AutoRegression (VAR)
 In notational form, mean-adjusted VAR of order p (VAR(p)) can be written as
Where,   is a (K×1) vector of variables at time t, the  (i=1,2,…p) are fi xed (K×K) 
coeffi cient matrices and  is a K-dimensional white noise or innovation process.
In order to estimate, VAR system, slippage ratio, call rate, infl ation, growth and REER were selected. The 
appropriate order of VAR has been selected based on minimum information criteria as well as other 
diagnostics and suitable order was found to be two. Accordingly, VAR of order 2 (VAR(2)) was estimated and 
stability of the model was checked based on roots of AR characteristic polynomial. Since, all roots are found 
to be inside the unit circle, this selected model was found to be fulfi lling the stability condition. The impact 
of various macroeconomic shocks was determined using impulse response function of the selected VAR.
 Quantile Regression
In order to estimate slippage ratio at desired level of conditional quantile, following quantile regression at 
median (which is the present quantile of slippage ratio) was used:
 
 Where, 
 Bank-group wise panel fi xed-effect regression
 Bank-group wise slippage ratios were estimated using the following fi x effect panel regression.
 where,  is the bank-group specifi c parameter and .
1 Slippage ratio, exports/GDP, and the call rate are seasonally adjusted.
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 Sectoral multivariate regression
The impact of macroeconomic shocks on various sectors was assessed by employing multivariate regression 
models using aggregate NPA ratio for each sector separately. The dependent variables consisted of lagged 
NPAs, sectoral GDP growth, infl ation, and short-term interest rate.
 Derivation of the NPAs and CRAR from the slippage ratios, which were projected from the above mentioned 
credit risk econometric models, were based on the following assumptions: credit growth of 15 per cent; 
recovery rate of 5.6 per cent, 6.3 per cent, 6.3 per cent and 9.6 per cent, during June, September, December 
and March quarters, respectively; write-offs rate of 3.3 per cent, 3.8 per cent, 4.6 per cent and 5.2 per cent, 
during June, September, December and March quarters, respectively; risk weighted assets growth of 18 per 
cent, and profi t growth assumed to be at 15 per cent, 5 per cent and -5 per cent under baseline, medium 
risk and severe risk, respectively. The regulatory capital growth is assumed to remain at the minimum by 
assuming minimum mandated transfer of 25 per cent of the profi t to the reserves account. The distribution 
of new NPAs in various sub-categories was done as prevailing in the existing stock of NPAs. Provisioning 
requirements for various categories of advances are 0.4 per cent for standard advances, 20 per cent for sub-
standard advances, 75 per cent for doubtful advances, and 100 per cent for loss advances. The projected 
values of the ratio of the non-performing advances were translated into capital ratios using the “balance 
sheet approach”, by which capital in the balance sheet is affected via the provisions and net profi ts. It is 
assumed that the existing loan loss provisioning coverage ratios remain constant for the future impact.
Single Factor Sensitivity Analysis – Stress Testing
As a part of quarterly surveillance, stress tests are conducted covering credit risk, interest rate risk, liquidity risk 
etc. Resilience of the commercial banks in response to these shocks is studied. The analysis covers all scheduled 
commercial banks..
Credit Risk
To ascertain the resilience of banks, the credit portfolio was given a shock by increasing NPA levels, for the 
entire portfolio as well as for select sectors, along with a simultaneous increase in provisioning requirements. 
For testing the credit concentration risk, default of the top individual borrower and the largest group borrower is 
assumed. The estimated provisioning requirements so derived were adjusted from existing provisions and the 
residual provisioning requirements, if any, were deduced from banks’ capital. The analysis was carried out both 
at the aggregate level as well as at the individual bank level, based on supervisory data as on March 31, 2013. The 
scenario assumed enhanced provisioning requirements of 1 per cent, 30 per cent and 100 per cent for standard, 
sub-standard and doubtful/loss advances, respectively. The assumed increase in NPAs was distributed across sub-
standard, doubtful and loss categories in the same proportion as prevailing in the existing stock of NPAs. The 
additional provisioning requirement was applied to the altered composition of the credit portfolio.
Interest rate risk
The fall in value of the portfolio or income losses due to the shifting of INR yield curve are accounted for the 
total loss of the banks because of the assumed shock. The estimated total losses so derived were reduced from 
the banks’ capital.
For interest rate risk in the banking book, Duration Analysis approach was considered, for computation of 
the valuation impact (portfolio losses) on the investment portfolio. The portfolio losses on investments were 
calculated for each time bucket based on the applied shocks. The resultant losses/gains were used to derive 
the impacted CRAR. The valuation impact for the tests on banking book was calculated under the assumption 
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that the HTM portfolio would be marked to market. In a separate exercise for interest rate shocks in trading 
book, the valuation losses were calculated for each time bucket on the interest bearing assets using duration 
approach.
Liquidity Risk
The aim of liquidity stress tests is to assess the ability of a bank to withstand unexpected liquidity drain without 
taking recourse to any outside liquidity support. The analysis is done as at end-March 2013. The scenario depicts 
different proportions (depending on the type of deposits) of unexpected deposit withdrawals on account of 
sudden loss of depositors’ confi dence and assesses the adequacy of liquid assets available to fund them.
Assumptions in the liquidity stress test are as follows:
• It is assumed that banks would meet stressed withdrawal of deposits through sale of liquid assets only.
• The sale of investments is done with a hair cut of 10 per cent of their market value.
• The stress test is done on a static mode.
Stress Testing of Derivatives Portfolio of Select Banks
The stress testing exercise focused on the derivatives portfolio of a representative sample set of top 22 banks in 
terms of notional value of derivatives portfolio. Each bank in the sample was asked to assess the impact of stress 
conditions on their respective derivatives portfolios.
In case of domestic banks, the derivatives portfolio of both domestic and overseas operations was included. In 
case of foreign banks, only the domestic (i.e. Indian) position was considered for the exercise. For derivatives 
trade where hedge effectiveness was established was exempted from the tests, while all other trades were 
included.
The stress scenarios incorporated four sensitivity tests consisting of the spot USD/INR rate and domestic interest 
rates as parameters
Table: Shocks for Sensitivity Analysis
Domestic Interest Rates
Shock 1
Overnight +250 bps
Upto 1yr +150 bps
Above 1yr +100 bps
Domestic Interest Rates
Shock 2
Overnight -250 bps
Upto 1yr -150 bps
Above 1yr -100 bps
Exchange rates
Shock 3 USD/INR +20 per cent
Exchange Rates
Shock 4 USD/INR -20 per cent
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Scheduled Urban Co-operative Banks
Credit Risk
Stress tests on credit risk were conducted on Scheduled Urban Co-operative Banks (SUCBs) using their asset 
portfolio as at end-March 2013. The tests were based on single factor sensitivity analysis. The impact on CRAR 
was studied under two different scenarios. The assumed scenarios were as under:
 Scenario I: 50 per cent increase in gross NPAs.
 Scenario II: 100 per cent increase in gross NPAs.
Liquidity Risk
Liquidity stress test based on cash fl ow basis in 1-28 days time bucket was also conducted, where mismatch 
[negative gap (cash infl ow less than cash outfl ow)] exceeding 20 per cent of outfl ow was considered stressful.
 Scenario I: Cash out fl ows in 1-28 days time bucket goes up by 50 per cent (no change in cash infl ows).
 Scenario II: Cash out fl ows in 1-28 days time bucket goes up by 100 per cent (no change in cash infl ows).
Non-Banking Financial Companies
Credit Risk
Stress tests on credit risk were conducted on Non-Banking Financial Companies (includes both Deposits Taking 
and Non-Deposit taking and Systemically Important) using their asset portfolio as at end-December 2012. The 
tests were based on single factor sensitivity analysis. The impact on CRAR was studied under two different 
scenarios;
 Scenario I: GNPA increased two times from the current level.
 Scenario II: GNPA increased 5 times from the current level.
The assumed increase in NPAs was distributed across sub-standard, doubtful and loss categories in the same 
proportion as prevailing in the existing stock of NPAs. The additional provisioning requirement was adjusted 
from the current capital position. The stress was conducted at individual NBFCs as well as at an aggregate level.
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